Why Arab states are terrified of US war with Iran

As an American attack on Iran seems increasingly inevitable, America’s allies in the Persian Gulf — the very nations hosting U.S. bases and bracing anxiously for an Iranian blowback — are terrified of escalation and are lobbying Washington to stop it .

The scale of the U.S. mobilization is indeed staggering. As reported by the Responsible Statecraft’s Kelley Vlahos, at least 108 air tankers are in or heading to the CENTCOM theater. As military officers reckon, strikes can now happen “at any moment.” These preparations suggest not only that the operation may be imminent, but also that it could be more sustainable and long-lasting than a one-off strike in Iranian nuclear sites last June.

There is an increasing sense of doom among the regional observers: given the scale of the build-up, there is no face-saving way for President Donald Trump to call off strikes and rescue himself from a situation into which he has needlessly driven himself into.

But while U.S. military planners look at target lists, Iraq and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states see only risk.

“They may like to see the Iranian leadership weakened, but all of them are more concerned about a scenario of chaos and uncertainty and the possibility of more radical elements coming to power there,” Anna Jacobs Khalaf, a Gulf analyst and non-resident fellow at the Arab Gulf States Institute, told Al Jazeera last month.

Since January, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Oman, alongside Turkey and Egypt, have been engaged in intense diplomacy to pull Washington and Tehran back from the brink. This is not because they harbor any sympathy for Tehran, but because they realize they would be on the front lines of the Iranian retaliation, and what happens after if the regime were to collapse.

As regional analyst Galip Dalay notes, in addition to the economic and security destabilization that might occur, there is the fact that as a rising hegemon in the region, Israel greatly benefits from the regime’s collapse.

“Iran’s power and ambition across the region is diminished, and the prospect of an Iran-centric order has receded,” he wrote for Chatham House this week. “For Middle Eastern leaders, the threats have changed: the greatest risks are now an expansionist and aggressive Israel, and the chaos of a potentially collapsed Iranian state.”

Bader al-Saif, an assistant history professor at Kuwait University, said something similar to the New York Times. “Bombing Iran goes against the calculus and interests of the Arab Gulf States, Neutralizing the current regime, whether through regime change or internal leadership reconfiguration, can potentially translate into the unparalleled hegemony of Israel, which won’t serve the Gulf States.”

For predominant Shi’a Iraq, the risk of political and social unrest looms. After decades of upheaval, following the U.S. invasion in 2003, Iraq is still struggling to form a stable political system and coherent government. Baghdad is desperate to stay out of this fight.

An expert with a profound knowledge of Iraqi politics who spoke with the Responsible Statecraft on condition of anonymity given the sensitivity of the matter, said, smaller, hardline Shi’a groups like Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Nujaba might feel compelled to attack the American troops in the region in Tehran’s defense.

However, the same source said that the main Shi’a political forces, comprising the Shiite Coordination Framework, including the State of the Law Coalition led by prospective Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, and the Fatah Alliance led by another influential commander turned politician Hadi al-Ameri, view a U.S.-Iran conflagration on their soil as an existential threat to their fragile sovereignty.

Tehran, too, is interested in ensuring Iraq stays outside the fray. What Tehran needs as it fights for its own survival is a functional neighbor and trade partner, capable of buying Iranian electricity, not a country relapsing into failure and chaos.

The danger to the Gulf is multidimensional. First, there is the immediate physical threat. Iran has repeatedly signaled that U.S. bases in the region are legitimate targets. The June 2025 attack on Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, following the U.S. strikes during the 12-day war, while with no casualties, remains a fresh and terrifying memory for Gulf leaders.

Any new, sustained campaign could see facilities in Qatar, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain come under fire from Iranian missiles or drone barrages. Statements from Iranian officials, such as Ali Shamkhani, the influential adviser to the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, suggest that this time the response would be much more severe than the largely symbolic strike on Al Udeid.

This threat is not hypothetical; Saudi oil facilities were crippled by an Iranian strike in 2019. The lesson was clear: Iran has the capability to strike the Gulf countries’ infrastructure. With nothing to lose in a war that would be seen as existential for the Iranian government, the motivation to strike at countries that host U.S. military bases would increase.

Even if the Gulf states were to be spared Iranian strikes on their territory, there would be other devastating consequences. These states are trying to diversify their economies and attract foreign investment and talent; a threat of regional war would send capital and people fleeing.

A potential refugee crisis is another major fear. The Iranian port of Bandar Abbas is a short boat ride from Dubai. A conflict that devastates Iran’s economy or triggers internal collapse could send thousands of displaced people across the water to the UAE.

Then there is a risk of an economic nightmare. As Iranian officials have explicitly warned, all options are on the table in the case of war, including blocking or mining the Strait of Hormuz. While a full closure is unlikely as it would severely harm Iran’s own oil exports to China, the IRGC Navy is now preparing a “smart” closure — selective interdiction that targets Western-linked tankers while allowing Chinese oil purchases to pass, Yemeni Houthi rebel style.

One-fifth of the world’s oil passes through that strait. As happened with the Houthi blockade of the Red Sea in response to the Israeli attacks in Gaza, the threat of closure will send insurance premiums skyrocketing and raise global oil prices.

That will raise the specter of inflation. Strikes on civilian oil infrastructure designed to spike global prices and raise interest rates would be a direct attack on Trump’s economic promise to Americans, in the year of the mid-terms.

Ultimately, there’s a heightened risk of a U.S. military attack ensuring Iran discards its official nuclear doctrine for civilian purposes only and opts for weaponization — ironically, the very outcome the war is ostensibly designed to prevent. Short of a full occupation of the country by the U.S. and Israel — an unrealistic prospect — there are no material obstacles for a dash for a bomb given Iran’s know-how, should such a political decision be taken in case the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei is incapacitated.

That would leave the GCC countries in a worst possible situation – living next to a revanchist, revisionist and potentially nuclear-armed Iran down the road. It would oblige them — certainly, Saudi Arabia and UAE — to seek their own nuclear deterrent plunging the region into a perilous, destabilizing arms race.

This broader fear of destabilization is the key reason why the Saudi Crown Prince and de-facto ruler Mohammad Bin Salman publicly ruled out the use of the Saudi air space for an attack on Iran. The UAE is on the same position, with Anwar Gargash, a key adviser to the president, calling for a “long-term diplomatic solution between Washington and Tehran”.

Despite the obvious risks, the Trump administration’s approach has been perplexing. Even as Iran has offered serious concessions on the nuclear issue, such as suspending enrichment, and economic incentives to the U.S. during the last round of talks in Geneva, Trump appears to be seeking Tehran’s capitulation across the board – not only on the nuclear file, but also regarding the ballistic missiles – an absolute red line for Iran.

Meanwhile, the military buildup accelerates causing profound anxiety in Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Doha, Muscat, Baghdad and elsewhere in the Middle East. America’s Gulf allies are not cheering for war; they are desperately trying to prevent it. Trump would be wise to heed their advice – for his own, and America’s, own good.

“The repercussions of a state collapse would far exceed what the Middle East has experienced as a result of conflict in Iraq, Syria, or Yemen, whether in the form of instability, migration, radicalism, the proliferation of armed groups, or regional spillover,” wrote Dalay. “Regional leaders believe the U.S. must give regional diplomacy a real chance. The alternative is a devastating war and another catastrophic cycle of conflict.”