A Better Greenland Deal | Foreign Affairs

Last week, U.S. President Donald Trump posted on social media that he and NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte had hammered out the “framework of a future deal with respect to Greenland.” The announcement came as a surprise, given Trump’s recent claims that he intended to “take control” of the island without close consultations with Europe. As recently as early January, Trump had threatened to seize Greenland “the hard way,” implying an openness to using military force after U.S. troops seized Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. Then, in mid-January, he threatened massive tariffs on European countries that sought to block his takeover and embarrassed European leaders by publicly releasing their toadying text messages and posting an AI-generated image of him raising an American flag in Greenland. But at Davos, Trump appeared to take a military seizure off the table and put tariffs on pause after what he described as “satisfactory” talks with Rutte.

Little is yet known about this potential deal. But it is in the United States’ national interest to have a larger presence in Greenland—and that is in Denmark and Greenland’s interest, too. Much has been made in the press about the cooperation that already exists among all three, and over decades, there have been no better allies for the United States than Greenland and Denmark when it comes to ensuring Arctic security. Competition is rapidly ramping up in the region among major powers, however, and a broader deal is needed to secure U.S. and European interests there. Trump will also feel a need to claim that his Greenland push has been victorious, meaning that Greenland, Denmark, and other European allies have an incentive to make sure he can declare a major “win” for the United States.

But such a deal needs ideological and rhetorical finesse. Because Trump needs the cooperation of Danes and Greenlanders for his objectives, he must immediately abandon his current rhetoric about annexation lest he turn them firmly against Americans for the foreseeable future. Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen has made it crystal clear that although Denmark is willing to negotiate on virtually every detail, the United States cannot claim sovereignty over the island. Nor should Washington want formal sovereignty: the majority of Greenlanders may want eventual independence from Denmark, but a January 2025 opinion poll shows that only a tiny proportion—around six percent—agreed that they want to “become a part of the United States.” Recent surveys from YouGov and Ipsos also show that exceptionally few Americans support a military takeover of Greenland. Trump avidly follows polls, and he must pursue a deal without force. Done right, a big, new deal among Denmark, Greenland, and the United States could reap all three enormous benefits.

TREASURE ISLAND

Greenland is central to U.S. national security in the Arctic, and the United States needs resources and trade from the island. The pursuit of closer ties with Greenland is therefore prudent—and consistent with Washington’s approach for over a century. The island anchors the northern boundary of the Greenland-Iceland–United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap, a critical maritime chokepoint between the Arctic and Atlantic Oceans. During both world wars, maintaining control of the GIUK Gap allowed Allied forces to counter the German navy; during World War II, the U.S. military entered Greenland after Germany occupied Denmark.

After the war ended, President Harry Truman offered to buy the island from Denmark for the equivalent of $1.6 billion. Although Denmark rejected the overture, it invited the United States to maintain a military presence, resulting in the construction of more than a dozen military bases and installations during the Cold War. NATO sought to control the crucial GIUK Gap, and it remains the main way Russian ships can enter the Atlantic and is key to Moscow’s ability to project power. The U.S. Defense Department’s 2024 Arctic Strategy, prepared under President Joe Biden, affirms the gap’s importance to U.S. national security.

Greenland has also recently emerged as a linchpin to great powers’ efforts to build resilient industrial and technological supply chains. It has significant deposits of 43 of the 50 minerals that the U.S. Department of Energy deemed crucial in its 2023 Critical Materials Assessment, including cobalt, lithium, and the rare-earth elements necessary to produce semiconductors, renewable energy products, and drones.

The United States already has de facto military sovereignty over Greenland, as stipulated in a defense agreement it signed with Denmark in 1951, which was revised in 2004. This agreement allows the United States to establish and operate as many bases on the island as it wants, as long as Greenland and Denmark are informed of changes to the defense setup. Denmark acknowledges Greenland’s necessity to U.S. security and has repeatedly welcomed the American military’s presence there.

TRIPLE TIME

A U.S. emphasis on annexing Greenland is profoundly counterproductive. But even before Trump adopted this rhetoric, Denmark, Greenland, and the United States were deepening their ties, recognizing that all three benefit from closer engagement. The United States reopened its consulate in Greenland in 2020, which had been closed since 1953. That same year, Washington once again awarded a long-term maintenance contract for Pituffik Space Base to a Greenlandic company to ensure regional stability and local investment. Denmark, Greenland, and the United States also worked to expand the island’s dual-use infrastructure, such as ports and airports. Simultaneously, the United States pursued a rigorous effort to map Greenland’s minerals. Sophisticated aerial surveys were undertaken by the U.S. Geological Survey, and its Danish and Greenlandic counterparts identified large reserves of lithium, cobalt, and rare-earth elements. The United States continued to tread diplomatically by helping Greenland’s mining authorities meet the high environmental and labor standards necessary to attract future European and U.S. private investments.

Denmark and the United States have also recently cooperated to prevent China and Russia from exerting undue influence in Greenland. Attempts in 2022 by Chinese companies and research institutions to establish a presence in Greenland have been unsuccessful because both Denmark and the United States discouraged them. As recently as May 2025, Greenland’s minister of mineral resources stressed that Greenland has no interest in entering into a cooperation agreement with China. In 2021, Denmark passed legislation to prevent foreign investments in critical infrastructure if they pose a threat to national security; Greenland is on the verge of passing a similar investment-screening law. And in 2025, Copenhagen responded to criticisms by Washington that it was not doing enough to protect Greenland by committing a total of $13.7 billion to capabilities and operations that strengthen Arctic security.

Trump can and should embrace these existing wins, several of which he can take direct credit for. But there is room for even deeper engagement—for a mutually beneficial trilateral deal. The United States needs reliable sources of critical minerals and the ability to defend the GIUK Gap in case of a great-power conflict, and this cannot be achieved if command and coordination in the Arctic is not streamlined. Greenland needs more economic development, especially in its mining, hospitality, and fishing sectors. Denmark understands that European security is fundamentally underpinned by U.S. deterrence. A big bargain presents an opportunity to address these interests simultaneously under an overarching framework.

Denmark has already committed $13.7 billion extra to Arctic security.

Such a deal must be facilitated with concrete, institutional engagement, including through the U.S. Congress, to give it structural and legal permanence. It is also crucial that the deal respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Greenland.

Instead of persisting with its coercive and confusing rhetoric, Washington should start with a major offer to reestablish bases in Greenland and to create the legal framework for contracts that benefit the Greenlandic workforce. The first component of any deal must be a revision and upgrade to the existing defense agreement among Denmark, Greenland, and the United States. This revision should address possible U.S. concerns about access and basing rights, including unrestricted troop movements. It should include provisions to expand the Pituffik Space Base, to establish a network of advanced radar stations to enhance early warning, and to build an integrated missile defense system on the island. The latter appears especially important to Trump, who has been stressing the need to include Greenland in his much-touted multilayered missile defense system, the Golden Dome. The island’s location near the shortest flight paths nuclear-armed missiles could take from China and Russia to the United States means that Greenland can play a key part in the Golden Dome, hosting radars and interceptors and functioning as a logistics hub in the defense of the North American continent.

To deliver on these initiatives, the United States needs to rapidly increase its investments into Arctic security. Given that Denmark already coordinates with the North American Aerospace Defense Command (the binational military organization currently comprised of Canada and the United States) on joint military exercises in Greenland, both Denmark and Greenland could be invited to join the organization. Even in the absence of a full invitation to join NORAD, Danish and Greenlandic liaison officers could be stationed at NORAD headquarters, and existing Danish surveillance systems can be integrated with NORAD’s to enhance situational awareness.

UNFINISHED BUSINESS

This deal should go well beyond military engagements. China is currently Greenland’s largest export market, absorbing nearly a quarter of the island’s exports (mostly seafood), making it economically dependent on China. As countries such as Sri Lanka and Zambia have found out, Chinese commercial generosity often entails eventual outright Chinese ownership of key infrastructure—something neither Greenland nor Europe wants. So a deal must primarily be based on new investments and commercial initiatives.

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce can quickly arrange a visit to Greenland for private-industry leaders. A specialized U.S. sovereign wealth fund could then be created, dedicated to a 30-year developmental vision for the Arctic, especially given that the effects of climate change in the region are making seaborne trade routes more profitable. This fund would prioritize investing in essential infrastructure such as airports, hotels, geological mapping, and mining, as well as incentivizing the Greenlandic fishing industry to shift its exports to Europe and the United States. Making the United States Greenland’s preferred security and export partner would do more for long-term relations between the two than anything that coercion could achieve.

China is currently Greenland’s largest export market.

To consolidate this economic interdependence, the United States should offer special import carve-outs for Danish and Greenlandic goods in both regulations and tariffs, as well as create new maritime routes for tourism and commerce that connect Greenland with Alaska and Maine. Greenland currently lacks the kind of qualified manpower it needs to attract much larger foreign investments in tourism, hospitality, fishing, and mining. American investments in those industries could come with a specialized labor arrangement between Danish and American workers to offset labor shortages and increase mutual trust. The United States should pair capital infusions into the mineral sector with a dedicated work-visa category for U.S. personnel in Greenland. Such a model would immediately stimulate local wealth creation by encouraging the growth of industry. Greenland is practically unknown to American tourists; only a twice-weekly flight to Nuuk exists from Newark. More flights can be set up immediately to boost U.S. tourism, generating more wealth for the island.

In return for U.S. investment commitments (and expanding on Greenland’s pending investment-screening law), the deal could also include provisions that exclude Chinese and Russian investments in critical infrastructure in Greenland, either explicitly or through references to national security considerations.

To accomplish all this, the United States should establish formal negotiation channels with Denmark and Greenland. At present, Danes and Greenlanders are wary of trusting any claims from the U.S. executive branch because of its rhetorical callousness. As Europeans, they prefer institutional frameworks and are uncomfortable with personalist politics and negotiations. Involving institutions is the only way any major deals between Greenland and Denmark can be sustained.

The high-level working group formed during a meeting between U.S. Vice President JD Vance, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and the Danish and Greenlandic foreign ministers earlier this month is a good start, but it must be a priority to quickly agree on the group’s mandate and members. Last March, legislators formed the Congressional Greenland Caucus, which could be used far more effectively as a bridge among Danish, Greenlandic, and American legislators, or paired with trilateral working groups to promote commercial interests.

SEAL THE DEAL

Perhaps most important, the Danish-Greenlandic-U.S. trilateral deal should be negotiated in close coordination with NATO. After he met with Trump in Davos, Rutte noted NATO allies need to step up more on Arctic security. An increased NATO presence in the Arctic could include an independent Arctic Command to coordinate activities in the region. Whatever form it takes, a greater NATO presence would help lessen the costs associated with protecting U.S. interests in the region, aligning with Trump’s desire for greater burden sharing within the alliance.

A stable and prosperous Denmark and Greenland, within a U.S.-secured Arctic, can be an enormous asset to the United States, deterring Russian and Chinese military adventurism. And a grand bargain could go some distance toward satiating Trump’s need to declare a public triumph. Denmark and Greenland should indulge Trump’s need to declare victory and consider combining the deal with symbolic gestures, such as a presidential visit to Greenland hosted by the Danish king. This will require considerable political courage from Danish and Greenlandic leaders, given that their publics’ sentiment has turned against Trump. But such political courage is needed to prioritize long-term national interests over short-term political interests.

In return, the United States must transition away from inflammatory and incoherent rhetoric on Greenland. U.S. sovereignty over the island is a nonstarter, both for Europeans and for U.S. citizens. Insisting on it will only fracture societies that need to work together to develop and secure what will be one of the most pivotal parts of the world in the coming century.

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