Could the purge of a senior Chinese general make war in Taiwan more likely?

In recent years, Chinese leader Xi Jinping has been systematically purging his country’s senior military leaders, part of an overall campaign that has meted out punishment to some 200,000 officials since he took power. It’s officially an anti-corruption program but also, most believe, an effort to consolidate power over China’s ruling Communist Party. Hundreds of senior officers have been removed, including former defense ministers.

But even after all that, this week’s announcement that China’s top general, Zhang Youxia, had been placed under investigation for “serious disciplinary and legal violations” came as a shock to China watchers. It was a sign that we know even less than we thought about what’s happening at the top of the world’s largest military at a time of escalating fears over a catastrophic global war over Taiwan. The concern, among analysts, is that with a potentially world historical decision looming, Xi may be removing the last people with the power to tell him “no.”

As vice chair of the Central Military Commission, Zhang was second-in-command of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) after Xi. His removal, along with Liu Zhenli, another senior general, leaves only Xi and one other low ranking member on the commission.

Zhang was seen as both extremely loyal to the party and highly competent, as well as one of the few Chinese military officers with real combat experience, having served in the ill-fated invasion of Vietnam in 1979. He was often described as Xi’s most important military ally.

Like Xi, he is a “princeling,” the son of a senior Communist Party leader. The two men’s fathers even served together in Mao Zedong’s army in Northwest China during the Chinese civil war, and the sons have likely known each other since childhood, though it’s not clear how close they are personally.

In other words, if anyone looked untouchable, it was Zhang. “This is not just another corruption case,” said Jason Hsu, a former Taiwanese legislator who is now a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. “This one is special.”

The exact reasons for Zhang’s ouster may never be known. Officially, according to an editorial published by the PLA Daily, he and Liu “fueled political and corruption problems that threaten the party’s absolute leadership over the armed forces and undermine the party’s governance foundation.” These problems adversely affected “the military’s political environment, and overall combat readiness, posing a serious adverse impact on the party, the country, and the military.”

The massive spending that has accompanied China’s military build-up in recent years has created ample opportunities for corruption. Reports have been leaked to the international media that Zhang had been accused of accepting bribes for promotions or sharing nuclear weapons information with the United States. Unsubstantiated rumors have also circulated on social media that Zhang was involved in a coup plot against Xi.

It’s hard to know how seriously to take these reports and rumors, but it may be enough that Xi or those around him were taking them seriously. Unlike most national militaries, the PLA is officially the armed wing of China’s ruling political party, so there’s a greater premium put on political loyalty, personal relationships, and ideological purity.

In Hsu’s view, Zhang’s ouster “signals internal anxiety” within China’s political leadership that there are “systemic political risks within the PLA.”

Zhang’s downfall likely comes as a shock to the system to anyone involved in China’s political system — if he can be purged, anyone can. But outside China, the more pressing question is what it could mean for the prospect of war in East Asia.

Although officially, China is still committed to a policy of “peaceful reunification” of Taiwan, the de facto independent island nation that it considers a rebellious province, US officials believe that Xi has set a goal for the military of being ready to retake Taiwan by force by 2027.

An amphibious invasion of a mountainous and densely populated island is a dicey proposition on its own, but the biggest unknown for Chinese military planners is whether the United States would go to war to defend Taiwan from an invasion or blockade. Under multiple presidential administrations, the US has maintained a policy of “strategic ambiguity” on that question.

President Donald Trump’s statements on the issue, his generally transactional attitude on questions of territorial integrity, his administration’s prioritization of the Western Hemisphere and border security over “great power competition,” and his aversion to costly military engagements (as opposed to quick decisive victories) have added to doubts about whether he would commit the US military to defend Taiwan. In a recent interview, Trump said “He (Xi) considers it to be a part of China, and that’s up to him what he’s going to be doing. But I’ve expressed to him that I would be very unhappy if he did that, and I don’t think he’ll do that.”

In a recent article, Yun Sun, director of the China Program at the Stimson Center, suggested that thanks to Trump’s indifferent attitude, Xi may be speeding up his timeline for reunification. “China may never again have a moment when Washington is so reluctant to intervene on Taiwan’s behalf,” she writes.

How does Zhang’s purge affect this dynamic? “Zhang has disagreed with Xi on acting on Taiwan,” Sun told Vox. “He is much more conservative from the military point of view. With the purge of him and his people, there is much less resistance in the system.”

Some analysts believe this resistance may be the reason why Zhang was purged. In the Chinese political system, political disagreements like these don’t often play out in public. But in 2024, Zhang published an editorial in the state-run People’s Daily highlighting areas where further improvements were needed to meet the China’s military’s goals for modernization and reform — particularly the ability to conduct complex joint operations. Some US analysts interpreted this to mean that Zhang was suggesting the military was not on pace to meet Xi’s deadline for being ready for action on Taiwan.

The Taiwanese analyst K. Tristan Tang suggests that Zhang’s ouster may have actually been related to disagreements over the pace of military reforms, with the general — who had firsthand experience of a failed invasion — favoring a slower timeline.

Does that mean an invasion or blockade is more likely now? In the near-term, at least, not necessarily. A moment when the military’s senior leadership is in turmoil is probably not the best time to launch a risky major operation.

Ming-Shih Shen, a researcher at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, a think tank affiliated with Taiwan’s Defense Ministry, told Vox by email that he believes China is unlikely to use force against Taiwan before 2027 barring a major provocative move from the Taiwanese side.

“Xi Jinping needs time to reorganize the military,” Shen said. “With such a significant replacement of generals, who can plan the offensive war planning against Taiwan, and who will command it?”

Xi has also reportedly sought concessions on Taiwan policy in trade talks with Trump. While these efforts haven’t borne fruit yet, the Chinese may be reluctant to upset US-China relations at a moment when Trump is making it very clear that he’s interested in cutting deals.

In the longer term, however, the picture gets murkier. Zhang’s purge “will likely reduce or eliminate opposition power to Xi Jinping’s attack intent on Taiwan, potentially allowing him to pursue his personal historical achievements,” Shen said.

“It’s not quite ‘truth to power’ in the way we talk about it here in the US, but probably as close as you’re going to get in the Chinese system,” said Brendan Mulvaney, Director of the China Aerospace Studies Institute, a US Air Force think tank that studies the Chinese military. “He may have been that voice of reason or moderation saying, ‘hey, look, we’ve come a really long way. We’ve got a plan. We’re working on it, but no, it’s still going to be a long time till we’re ready.’”

Zhang also maintained good relations with international counterparts. In a Substack post, Drew Thompson, a China analyst and former Defense Department official who had interacted with the general, recalls that he had “an aura of competence about him” and “wasn’t afraid to talk to foreigners unlike some other senior officers who were often afraid or unable to engage.” The rumors about nuclear leaks suggest this willingness to talk to foreigners may have been a liability, but it also likely means there will be even less leader-to-leader contact between the two countries’ defense establishments at a moment of high tension.

In a recent article for Foreign Affairs, the political scientists Seva Gunitsky and Semuhi Sinanoglu described the emergence of a “personalist world order” in which the world’s three preeminent military powers, the US, China, and Russia, are led by leaders “driven purely by their own private fixations and incentives rather than coherent national interests.”

In Putin’s case, his decision in 2022 to launch the disastrous invasion of Ukraine appears to have been motivated by his personal historical fixations and vision of restoring Russian greatness. It was abetted by the fact that, as Gunitsky and Sinanoglu write, “no one dared tell Putin” it was a terrible idea more likely to lead Russia into a costly and bloody quagmire than a quick and decisive victory.

Xi is a very different leader than Putin, but similarly to his Russian counterpart, he has made clear that he believes taking control of Taiwan is necessary for the “rejuvenation” of the Chinese nation.

We don’t know whether or when Xi might be willing to take a gamble to achieve that goal that risks thousands of Taiwanese and Chinese lives, would have disastrous consequences for the global economy and potentially lead to a war between two nuclear armed superpowers. But we do know he appears to be eliminating the kind of people who might be willing to tell him it’s not a good idea.