How Much Abuse Can America’s Allies Take?

Donald Trump’s rise was supposed to have upended the liberal international order. In his first term, Trump openly disparaged longtime European allies, pulled out of international treaties such as the Paris climate agreement, and decried how the United States was subsidizing its allies through military support and trade deficits. Yet as we argued in Foreign Affairs in 2022, Trump’s aggressive unilateralism did not break U.S. alliances. Shaken and often irritated by Washington’s bullying, the allies nevertheless did not drift away from the world’s preeminent superpower. The foreign relations doctrines, defense spending, and geopolitical alignments of core U.S. partners such as France, Germany, Japan, and South Korea did not shift in any meaningful way during the first Trump administration. Instead, these countries accommodated Trump because they felt that loosening ties with the United States would be more dangerous to their economic and security interests than trying to stand up to his abuse.

Trump’s second term has put this dynamic to an even sterner test. The president’s disdain for U.S. allies and partners is much greater this time around. He has talked about annexing Canada and Greenland, bombing Mexico, retaking the Panama Canal, and giving up on Ukraine and Taiwan, to name just a few. Trump, claiming that allies are ripping off the United States, is demanding large, ill-defined investments in the United States that look a lot like bribes. For instance, he wants a staggering $600 billion investment guarantee from the European Union to be used at his discretion. He seems to be leaning into the notion that alliances are not pillars of a mutually beneficial network but elements of a protection racket—and that it’s high time for the United States to reap the rewards.

If allies had hoped that the election of Joe Biden in 2020 would restore traditional American liberal internationalism, Trump’s reelection proves that the foreign policy belligerence and explicit quid pro quo basis for U.S. commitments evident in his first term was not an aberration. Instead, as demonstrated in the administration’s just-released National Security Strategy, it will probably be a core part of U.S. foreign policy moving forward. Future Republican leaders are likely to continue to promote Trump’s overall policy direction. And even if the Democrats retake control, the ability of Trump-aligned Republicans to exercise power in a two-party system will undermine the United States’ reliability as an ally.

So far in Trump’s second term, U.S. allies have not yet defected. In October, Trump visited Japan and South Korea, and each country’s leaders signaled their desire to stay in the president’s good graces. Just as we concluded in 2022, the allies still seem to be all right. But they are much more worried than before. Unlike eight years ago, countries can no longer wish away the implications of a United States that might not support them in a crisis. Instead, over the next decade, it is likely that U.S. allies will start to noticeably drift away. They may still hope for U.S. support, but they are also starting to hedge against the possibility that the United States will be absent when problems arise by building alternative alliance structures, considering obtaining nuclear weapons, and even brokering separate peace deals with, rather than confronting, regional opponents. Without being able to predict how Trump would respond to calls for help in a major war or a nuclear crisis with China, Russia, or North Korea, U.S. allies have no choice but to shift their long-term strategies to reduce their dependence on Washington.

ANXIOUSLY ATTACHED

In the first year of Trump’s second term, U.S. allies have remained tied to the United States. As in Trump’s first term, many allied leaders seem to believe that Trump can be wrangled into commitments and binding deals that will keep the United States involved in supporting their security needs. European efforts to engage Washington on Ukraine’s behalf in its war with Russia show how dependent on the United States the allies still are. Trump does not appear to want to help Ukraine, and he has expressed his admiration for Russian President Vladimir Putin. Yet many European countries are not swiftly ramping up their defense industrial spending to a level that could meet Ukraine’s war needs independently of U.S. financial and weapons support. Nor are they finding homegrown alternatives to U.S. logistics and intelligence gathering. Three and a half years into the conflict, European leaders are still coming to the White House to flatter Trump rather than making themselves less reliant on the United States.

U.S. allies in East Asia, too, have sought to get closer to Trump rather than push him away. Both Japan and South Korea have capitulated to Trump’s investment demands. As part of the trade deal it struck with Washington in July, for instance, Tokyo agreed to invest $500 billion in the United States, although whether Japan actually hits this target and the exact details of who controls this money remain contested. And despite their proximity to China, North Korea, and Russia, neither Japan nor South Korea has ramped up defense spending enough to free itself from reliance on the United States. U.S. military forces stationed in Japan and South Korea remain deeply interwoven with their host militaries, and joint drills continue. In fact, the United States is pushing both countries to allow U.S. military assets based on their territory to be used in offensive operations to counter China, not simply for the protection of the host countries. Knowing that they do not want to face surrounding threats alone, U.S. allies in East Asia continue to accommodate Trump’s demands even as his rhetoric grows tougher and his actions more aggressive.

INKLINGS OF CHANGE

As we described in our 2022 essay, one reason that many countries in Europe and Asia ally with the United States is that its geographic distance makes it unlikely to be a direct military threat. Thus, even if it is not a dependable friend, the strategic benefits of working with the United States are enticing enough for U.S. allies to hope that they can keep placating Trump. But hope is not a strategy. And that is why concerns about Trump and the likely trajectory of U.S. foreign policy eventually, grudgingly, will push U.S. allies to hedge.

Despite their ongoing reliance on the United States in the short term, these allies will seek to protect themselves against American irresponsibility going forward. This includes both increasing domestic spending to make themselves more self-reliant in defense and infrastructure and pursuing a wider range of partners for fear that the United States will not help in a conflict.

In some ways, Trump is accelerating this shift. The U.S. president has consistently demanded that allies spend more on their own defense. In the Trump administration’s new National Security Strategy, for instance, the need for burden sharing is a central theme. Although the United States claims it still wants and expects a robust network of allies, particularly in Europe and Asia, the strategy makes clear that Washington’s role should be as a “conveyer and supporter,” rather than primary provider, of other countries’ security. But by requiring more defense spending as a prerequisite for good relations with Washington, the Trump administration is also reducing its allies’ need for U.S. protection.

Allies will seek to protect themselves against American irresponsibility going forward.

Some changes are already occurring. Japan’s government has begun expanding its missile force and policymakers in South Korea are debating building an aircraft carrier or pursuing nuclear weapons, all of which would help such countries independently project power. These moves reflect China’s maritime expansion and North Korea’s nuclear threats as well as American unreliability. In Europe, defense budgets are moving toward a previously unheard of five percent of GDP; this level of spending is likely to result in a substantial expansion of military power in large continental economies such as France, Germany, and Poland, which would enable them to operate more independently as security providers to the continent. But it is unclear how long these countries are willing to sustain such spending levels, which is why Europe hopes to not lose the U.S. security umbrella and has still tried to reach out to Washington for support.

A clear indicator of when U.S. allies are hedging would be if they develop enhanced logistical capacity through developing their own so-called C4ISR systems—command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance—that do not require U.S. infrastructure. Ultimately, for Europe to be fully independent, it will need to be capable in all of these areas. This is becoming increasingly important because Trump has occasionally threatened to cut off Ukraine from U.S. intelligence, and there are fears of a “kill switch” in U.S.-made weapons systems that would allow Washington to control allies’ technology. Germany’s ramped-up defense spending, for instance, is already prioritizing European producers to reduce dependence on the United States. And American allies that may wonder about the reliability of U.S. nuclear backing could pursue their own nuclear weapons. There is widespread public support in South Korea for obtaining nuclear weapons, and leaders in Poland have discussed the need to pursue a nuclear deterrent.

If allies feel that U.S. security guarantees are unreliable, they may ultimately be forced to go even further and seek compromise with U.S. adversaries. Small, exposed partners such as Taiwan and South Korea would likely strike a deal over territorial disputes, missile defenses, or maritime borders with China if Washington pulls out of East Asia. And if Trump finally abandons Ukraine, leaders in Kyiv may have to accept territorial losses and sue for peace.

TO HEDGE OR NOT TO HEDGE

Hedging will be difficult and costly. The most obvious reason that U.S. allies continue to appease Trump is the deep entanglement of their militaries with that of the United States. It will take a long time and a huge amount of resources to unwind that interoperability. U.S. allies currently access many logistics and intelligence-gathering systems, such as satellites, at low cost from the United States, which they would otherwise have to pay for themselves. And publics around the world have long accustomed themselves to the U.S. security blanket. Pursuing greater independence would mean higher taxes, social spending cuts, and possibly conscription or nuclearization—all of which are likely to be jarring and unnerving to citizens, who may vote out of office those politicians who seek the path of hedging.

But having its allies seeking alternatives is not all bad news for Washington. If U.S. allies become more autonomous in paying for their own security, the United States, which has long complained about free riding, will achieve what it has long wanted: allies that are more able to support themselves. And as its allies gain more autonomy, there is the possibility that policymakers in Washington, including those with an “America first” mindset, will recognize how a robust alliance network benefits the United States by giving it access points to conduct military and intelligence operations around the world without needing to foot the entire bill.

In an ideal world, the United States would still be the best security provider for U.S. allies. For the leaders of many of these countries, it is worth hoping that, as Winston Churchill supposedly quipped, the United States will always do the right thing after exhausting all other options. But these allies do not find themselves in an ideal world, and the possibility that the United States under Trump or one of his followers will ultimately do the right thing by its allies is more in doubt than perhaps at any time in the nearly 80 years since the modern U.S. alliance system took shape. Hoping that the United States eventually does the right thing or rediscovers the benefits of strong alliances is not a viable long-term strategy. The prudent step is hedging. America’s allies remain committed to Washington for now, but they are anxious enough to start looking elsewhere for support.

Loading…