Iran and the Limits of American Power

Over two weeks into wide-scale protests against the Islamic Republic regime in Iran, the death toll and number of arrests are rapidly mounting. Iranian human rights organizations place the number of dead at 2,500, while other sources suggest it may exceed 10,000. Needless to say, the Iranian people have displayed remarkable bravery in challenging an authoritarian government that still retains immense repressive power. And by emboldening Iranians to turn out by repeatedly raising the prospect of U.S. military intervention to defend Iranian demonstrators, U.S. President Donald Trump is implicated as well in the outcome of the protests.

There are, however, major question marks regarding the potential efficacy of U.S. military action in protecting demonstrators. Unfortunately, one of the few judgments that can be made with some confidence is that foreign military intervention is unlikely to produce a consolidated democracy of any kind, let alone one favorable to the interests of the intervening power. If, as should be the case, the U.S. objective is to support the Iranian people in transitioning to democratic governance, success may hinge on what Trump chooses not to do. Although the United States can and should help, how it does so will determine whether its influence proves beneficial or detrimental to the Iranian people—in whose hands Iran’s fate ultimately must lie.

PULLING THE TRIGGER

As the regime’s violence against Iranian demonstrators has increased, Iranians and international observers have turned their eyes to the White House for any sign that Trump will follow through on threats to intervene. Trump sharply criticized the regime the day after protests began in Tehran’s Grand Bazaar on December 28 over primarily economic issues. The demonstrations quickly expanded and turned political, leading Trump to declare on January 2 that the United States was “locked and loaded.” He later dismissed the deaths of Iranians on January 8 as the result of “three stampedes,” suggesting he would not “hold anyone responsible for that.” But since then, he has largely stuck to a more hawkish tone, confirming that his administration was examining military options, pronouncing on January 9 that the Iranian regime had crossed a redline and on January 13 that “help is on its way.”

It is conceivable that Trump is telegraphing a U.S. attack, that he has yet to make a decision, or that he is deliberately trying to sow confusion. Even if his thinking falls into one of these categories, the president could always change his mind. That said, it seems clear that Trump has recently become more comfortable taking military risks, which increases the likelihood of U.S. military involvement. Never a true isolationist, he views his second term military actions as successful, culminating in the tactically impressive though strategically puzzling capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. Evocative news stories, the use of raw power, and minimal casualties all appeal to Trump—and a strike on Iran could supply all three. Since the target of these operations would not necessarily be the nuclear facilities he claims to have “obliterated” last June, Trump could direct a resumption of U.S. military activity in Iran without taking on undue risk or undermining his narrative of success.

Another factor in Trump’s decision will be his perception of whether the government or the protesters are likely to triumph in the end. The president is loath to associate himself with a losing cause (he once defamed fallen American soldiers as “suckers”). If it appears that the regime is on the verge of quelling the protests, he is more likely to distance himself from the Iranian people’s cause than to intervene to preempt a massacre. Alternatively, Trump may be eager to deliver the coup de grâce against a regime that is already coming apart at the seams. The president’s refusal to meet with the former crown prince of Iran, Reza Pahlavi, in Mar-a-Lago, has been attributed to a perception in the White House that he does not have the mettle to lead Iran even if the regime is toppled.

OPTIONS OPEN

The United States cannot, unfortunately, directly protect Iranian protesters from the air. U.S. planes cannot lower a protective shield over demonstrations or maintain persistent overwatch to neutralize regime aggressors approaching the protesters. In theory, the deployment of U.S. soldiers on the ground, which Trump has ruled out, could provide better protection, but given the proximity of demonstrators and regime elements, “friendly fire” incidents would be likely. Unlike in Libya in 2011, where a “no-drive” zone afforded some Libyans protection, the Trump administration can only protect Iranians through indirect means.

Within the broad parameters Trump has established, U.S. options can be grouped into two categories: those intended to deter further Iranian escalation against protesters and the United States, and those aimed at disrupting the ability of Iranian security forces to attack Iranian demonstrators. Although some options serve both purposes, most tend to skew more toward one category than the other. Strikes against ballistic missile manufacturing and storage sites or senior Islamic Republic officials, for instance, would fall into the deterrence category. Further degrading Iranian ballistic missiles would undermine Iran’s ability to retaliate or initiate hostile action against external adversaries, leaving it vulnerable, but would have scant direct impact on the regime’s repressive capabilities. Depending on the leader or leaders targeted, a “personae operation” could temporarily impair the Islamic Republic’s internal operations. The primary effect of such strikes, however, would be deterrent in nature; other senior Iranian leaders would be compelled to contemplate their own mortality before supporting additional violence against protesters.

Disruption, on the other hand, would involve strikes against communications infrastructure, manufacturers of equipment deployed against protests, command-and-control facilities, and key internal security bases. Some of these targets could be hit through cyber means, while others would require traditional kinetic action. The primary purpose of these operations would be inflicting concrete damage—slowing down or, ideally, preventing coherent regime responses to protests, and thereby creating some space for demonstrators to operate. If it were harder to communicate, organize, and concentrate forces, the regime would be less effective in repressing internal dissent. As in the deterrence category, personae targets can be relevant for disruption, but since the 2020 killing of Qasem Soleimani, the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force, no single Iranian leader has been especially important to the regime. The killing or incapacitation of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei would cause the most prolonged disruption, but the IRGC and other security bodies are sufficiently cohesive and dedicated to the Islamic Republic that they could be expected to resume operations quickly.

If Trump chooses to intervene, he would be likely to authorize either a one-off strike or a short series of strikes, refraining from deploying boots on the ground. (Operation Midnight Hammer during the June war would be the logical template for strikes on nuclear facilities or other major infrastructure.) But he would have a variety of operations within those broad parameters, in terms of means of attack (cyber-intrusions, ship-launched missiles, stand-off and direct-fire plane-launched missiles), targets, and objectives. The U.S. military is more than capable of conducting special operations on Iranian soil similar if not identical to the one to seize Maduro in Caracas, but the risk of a failure of the magnitude of President Jimmy Carter’s hostage recovery attempt in Iran in 1980 is probably too great for Trump to consider. What role, if any, Israel would play in support of a U.S. mission is another unknown. Iran would likely feel compelled to retaliate for any of these options, but the regime can be expected to calibrate its response unless it views the strikes as an existential threat.

THE LONG GAME

What all these options have in common is that they are unlikely to afford the protesters more than temporary protection. Disruptions to command and control and the elimination of key leaders can create passing confusion, but unless that chaos coincides with a concerted push by the opposition to advance on the most important public institutions, it would not have a strategic effect. Similarly, U.S. strikes aimed at deterrence could induce short-term restraint toward protesters by the Iranian regime. If, however, the regime deemed that the demonstrations are close to bringing down the Islamic Republic, even the threat of U.S. intervention would be insufficient to temper the repression of this brutal government. This survival instinct is likely to prove more powerful than other considerations, such as whether U.S. intervention on balance emboldens demonstrators or unifies other parts of the public behind the regime.

Ultimately, military strikes would succeed or not depending on their effect on Iran and the aspirations of the protesters. Although it is impossible to generalize a single motivation driving the demonstrations, the widespread calls of “freedom, freedom, freedom” suggest that democracy is at the forefront of Iranian demands—and the track record of foreign intervention to promote democratization is disappointing, to say the least. For every Germany or Japan, the historical record is littered with several other failed examples. Critically, this is not a statistical aberration or anomaly but a direct cause and effect.

Whatever the intentions of the intervening country, the introduction of a foreign power distorts politics in the country it enters. Instead of seeking to build consensus among their fellow citizens and developing enduring policy solutions, local leaders appeal to the foreign power for both protection and resources. This externalization of focus and ultimate authority interrupts pathways to democratic consolidation. In other words, foreign powers can topple regimes and even preside over the installation of democratic governments, but in so doing they all but guarantee their long-term failure. The risks are particularly acute when the military is involved.

With Trump at the helm, there is even more cause for skepticism that intervention would be designed to support democratization. One need only look at Venezuela, where it took Trump literally just hours after capturing Maduro to throw the Venezuelan opposition leader, María Corina Machado, under the bus. Indeed, it is more accurate to label that U.S. intervention a regime face-lift, placing Maduro’s unelected vice president in charge, than regime change.

On balance, the potential ephemeral benefits of airstrikes (or even a special operations mission) do not offset the risk that Iran would escalate against both the United States and the demonstrators or precipitate the need for sustained military involvement. Even if the U.S. military is successful in protecting demonstrators and tipping the balance of power toward the opposition, it would likely prove a Pyrrhic victory that makes the genuine liberation of the Iranian people all but impossible. Increasing the intensity of cyberattacks, on the other hand, may be worth trying because it would probably not provoke kinetic Iranian retaliation or have counterproductive unintended consequences for Iranian internal dynamics.

A FINE BALANCE

The United States does have an interest in the outcome of Iran’s protests, and past U.S. action, and inaction, are part of the explanation of why the Islamic Republic is facing an existential crisis now. Going forward, the U.S. government should neither seek to dictate events in Iran nor pretend to be a bystander. If the Trump administration is serious about helping Iranians, it should seek to balance the limits of U.S. influence with the imperative to support a beleaguered people whose fate will have important ramifications for regional and international security.

To start, Trump should cease threatening or implying the threat of U.S. military involvement in Iran unless he in fact intends to intervene. His prior statements have encouraged some of the demonstrators to turn out and expose themselves to potentially fatal risks. Protesters have renamed streets after Trump, planted stickers with his name on them, and pleaded for him to send the U.S. military. It is not just unpresidential but inhumane to bluff when lives are on the line.

At the same, the Trump administration should be doing everything possible to flood Iran with free Starlink terminals to circumvent Iran’s Internet blackout. Although the tech entrepreneur Elon Musk has made Starlink services free, that is of little value unless more Iranians have access to the equipment. The regime has been able to disrupt Starlink services with GPS and other jamming equipment, potentially acquired from its allies abroad. Yet Musk is famous (or infamous) for pushing his employees to achieve seemingly impossible feats; this is an occasion when such an effort would be a force for good. Unlike direct military intervention, the provision of communications and information equipment would furnish Iranians with the ability to forge connections with each other in a more organic fashion.

The administration should also encourage its allies to establish an international tribunal with the authority to investigate and try violations of international law, gross violations of human rights, and other flagrant abuses by the Iranian government. This new body must be authorized to investigate lower-ranking Iranian security personnel, whose decision-making and actions are more likely to be swayed than senior regime officials already implicated in severe abuses. If Iranian officers and rank-and-file security agents and police must consider their personal fates in a post–Islamic Republic Iran, it is possible they will think twice before giving or executing repressive orders. It is precisely these types of breaks in the security establishment that could change the balance of power on the ground. Given U.S. efforts to insulate its own officials and that of its allies from international justice in recent years, no U.S. administration will have the credibility to lead on such an initiative. Fortunately, some U.S. allies are better positioned.

Trump should also refrain from seeking to negotiate a new nuclear arms control agreement if the price is sanctions relief. Although the regime is clearly trying to distract from the protests with its offer to negotiate, it is unlikely that Tehran would agree to a meaningful new accord as long as Khamenei is in power. Even if there is definitive evidence that Khamenei would negotiate, it would be unwise to parley with a government that has a dubious lifespan. Indeed, there is a risk that in cutting a deal that empowers the regime, the Iranian opposition could turn against the United States. That would make future cooperation on Iran’s nuclear program challenging, regardless of who rules the country.

Short of a full agreement, however, the administration could consider abstaining from military intervention in Iran in exchange for the return of International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors. If the opposition overthrows the regime, it may be difficult to track down the remains of Iran’s nuclear program. Giving the IAEA a head start and some continuity in monitoring nuclear facilities would establish the best possible foundation for a future agreement. The regime is unlikely to agree to this arrangement, but trading military action (rather than sanctions relief) for access would clearly be in U.S. interests.

A SUPPORTING ROLE

The United States is a superpower, but that does not make it omnipotent. There are many situations in which, no matter the effort invested, success will be elusive. There are also situations in which the United States might have a chance of success, but where unilateral action is still not warranted given the risks and who is most likely to suffer should something go wrong. Both cautions apply to any conceivable U.S. military operation in Iran, creating a prohibitively high risk-to-reward ratio. Trump has no credible option to directly defend Iranian protesters, while indirect means to protect the Iranian people through deterrence or disruption of regime forces are unlikely to buy much time. The costs of failure (Iranian retaliation against protesters or the United States) are real; the costs of success (another failed democratic transition produced by military intervention) would be tragic.

In this case, a successful policy is one that empowers the Iranian people to retake control of their own future. The United States has an important supporting, not starring, role to play in this endeavor.

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