Iran has a long history of being screwed over by Russia, and last week’s meeting in Moscow between Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Russian President Vladimir Putin over the U.S.–Israel–Iran war suggests nothing in that dynamic is about to change, according to extremely well-placed sources on both sides who spoke exclusively to OilPrice.com over the weekend. On the one hand, Tehran’s perennially baseless optimism that “this time will be different” was on full display in Araghchi’s excited praise for the marvels of the two countries’ so called ‘strategic relationship’. On the other hand, Moscow responded with all the warmth of an international telephone operator: Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said only that Russia stands ready to offer “goodwill or mediation services”, with no indication of any upgrade to the relationship service package. It fits so neatly into the familiar pattern of this abusive relationship that one wonders whether social services should be called. Or perhaps Moscow’s disinterest is merely an act — a way of masking the deep and broad assistance from Tehran that it so clearly craves?
The theoretical basis of this relationship is the 20-year comprehensive cooperation deal between Iran and Russia — formally titled The Treaty on the Basis of Mutual Relations and Principles of Cooperation between Iran and Russia — approved by Iran’s late Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, on 18 January 2024, as I exclusively reported in OilPrice.com at the time. It replaced the 10-year deal signed in March 2001 (extended twice by five years) and was expanded in duration, scope and scale, particularly in the defence and energy sectors. In several respects, the new deal complemented key elements of the all-encompassing Iran-China 25-Year Comprehensive Cooperation Agreement, first revealed anywhere in the world in my 3 September 2019 article and analysed in full in my latest book on the new global oil market order. The similarities were deliberate, designed to make the division of the key strategic assets most coveted by Moscow and Beijing easier to manage in practice. Related: China Orders Refiners to Ignore U.S. Sanctions on Key Iranian Oil Buyers
As with much of Russia’s foreign policy dealings, the devil was in the details. As a sign of how things would pan out for Tehran in the rest of the document, Russia stood to benefit at Iran’s expense in the key energy sector to begin with. The deal gave Russia the first right of extraction in the Iranian section of the Caspian Sea, including the potentially huge Chalous field. This came on top of Russia’s startlingly brazen theft in 2019 of at least US$3.2 trillion in revenues from Iran through the lost value of energy products across their shared Caspian assets going forward. The same right of first extraction for Russia was also applied in the new 20-year deal to several of Iran’s major oil and gas fields in the Khorramshahr and nearby Ilam provinces that border Iraq, which China had not already prioritised for its own needs. Several of these sites had the broader financial and geopolitical benefits attached to their being shared fields with Iraq. This status allowed the effective free movement of Iranian oil disguised as Iraqi oil, and extended Tehran’s influence over Baghdad through its political, economic, and military proxies. By extension, it did the same for Moscow and Beijing, which used this as a springboard to further project their influence across the Iran-dominated Shia Crescent of Power.
This powerbase in Iran and Iraq had also been central to Russia’s longstanding plan to build a ‘land bridge’ to the Mediterranean Sea coast of another of its key global assets at the time — Syria. This would enable Moscow to exponentially increase weapons delivery into southern Lebanon and the Golan Heights area of Syria to be used in attacks on Israel. The core aim of this policy was to provoke a conflict in the Middle East that would draw in the U.S. and its allies into an unwinnable war, and was seen as a natural extension of the Israel-Hamas War that had begun after the terrorist organisation’s murderous spree across Israel on 7 October 2023. Given its centrality to Moscow’s plans, then, Iran was at that point still confident that the Kremlin would meet its other promises in the 20-year deal, despite the shenanigans surrounding the energy side of the treaty as it related to the Caspian’s oil and gas riches. “Iran had long been asking Russia for the means to defend itself better against any attacks, especially those that might come from Israel or the U.S. — in particular for the S-400 missile defence system and Sukhoi Su-34 and 35 fighter jets,” a very senior source working closely with Iran’s Petroleum Ministry exclusively told OilPrice.com. “But these requests have continually been subject to further conditionality by Russia, such as upgrading key airports and seaports that Moscow sees as especially useful for dual-use by its air force and navy, and which are also close to major oil and gas facilities.
The terms of the individual defence and energy deals were also made increasingly onerous for Iran by Russia as preconditions for the final delivery of Iran’s requests. According to this source — and confirmed to OilPrice.com at the time by a very senior source working closely with the Russian government — the price of all items traded between Russia and Iran, including military and energy hardware, had been formalised in the 20-year deal on terms that were not in Iran’s favour. For Iranian goods exported to Russia, Tehran would receive the cost of production plus 8 per cent. However, these export sales to Russia would not be transferred to Iran, but rather would be held as credit in the Central Bank of Russia (CBR). Moreover, Iran would receive a huge markdown on US dollar/Rouble or Euro/Rouble exchange rates used to calculate its credits in the CBR. Conversely, for Russian goods exported to Iran, Moscow would receive the payment in advance of delivery and at an exchange rate that benefited Russia. Moreover, the base price before any exchange rate calculations would be set at the highest price that Russia has received in the previous 180 days for whichever product it was selling to Iran. Moscow ensured itself the highest possible price by selling the relevant product to Belarus at a very large premium shortly beforehand, so establishing the required pricing benchmark. Payments for goods and services falling outside the direct finance route between the central banks of the two countries would be handled through interbank transfers between Iranian and Russian banks. Transactions involving renminbi would also be routed through China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System, Beijing’s alternative to the globally-dominant Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications system.
The additional problem for Iran now is that Russia is increasingly unable to provide even this limited assistance to it as its own troubles mount. Although U.S. President Donald Trump’s stance on Russia’s ’10-Day Special Military Operation’ — at the time of writing, in its 1,530th day — has broadly favoured Putin and his ability to keep funding the conflict, things have turned very recently. The removal of pro-Putin Hungarian President Viktor Orbán in last month’s general election removed the obstacle that blocked €90 billion in European Union (E.U.) aid to Ukraine, with more to come as and when needed. This comes at a time when, according to military sources, Russia is only able to replace 70 per cent of the soldiers it is losing on the battlefield — an unsustainable loss, which brings with it the deeply politically unsettling prospect of having to widen conscription out to the big cities, including Moscow and St. Petersburg. Moreover, Ukraine is now relentlessly hitting key oil and gas infrastructure targets deep in Russia, reducing its ability to monetise these exports to fund its Ukraine campaign. Crude oil export data suggested the rise in prices, plus the easing of U.S. sanctions on countries buying Russian oil, boosted Russian revenues to 2.3 times their December-February levels in the third week of the Iran war. But by the fourth week, Ukrainian drone strikes on energy-producing infrastructure reduced Russia’s earnings by US$1 billion, eradicating around two-thirds of the previous week’s gains. And destroying Russia’s energy infrastructure using Ukraine-manufactured long-range drones — without any U.S. assistance and using E.U. funding — is now a priority target.
As it stands, Iran has once again bet on a partner that takes far more than it ever gives. And as Russia’s own position deteriorates, even the illusion of reciprocity is evaporating. Tehran may soon discover that Moscow’s promises were always worth less than the paper they were written on. With Russia now struggling to sustain its own war effort, the chances of it honouring its commitments to Iran are shrinking by the day. And when the Kremlin finally admits it has nothing left to offer, Tehran will be left with no air defences, no aircraft, no navy, and no leverage — only the bill for a partnership that never paid out.
By Simon Watkins for Oilprice.com
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