Russia was never supposed to have Starlink, so why did SpaceX wait so long to cut it off? — Meduza

On February 4, pro-war military bloggers reported that Russia’s frontline troops had lost access to Starlink satellite Internet. While Ukrainian forces have had official access to Starlink since the start of the full-scale invasion, many Russian units have relied on contraband devices as a key element of their battlefield communications. Until now, Elon Musk’s SpaceX has appeared willing to turn a blind eye to Russia’s unauthorized use of Starlink. Previous system failures that were mistaken for targeted outages turned out to be false alarms, and Ukrainian officials warned that cutting off Starlink access in Russian-occupied territories would be “catastrophic” for Kyiv’s frontline drone warfare. This time, however, the outage is not accidental: it comes after Russian troops started equipping their own drones with Starlink en masse and carrying out attacks on the Ukrainian army’s rear positions. Now, Kyiv and SpaceX face the challenge of engineering a Starlink blackout for the Russian side without hampering the Ukrainian military. 

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How is Starlink used on the front lines in Ukraine? 

During the first two years of the full-scale invasion, the Ukrainian military developed a comprehensive communications and control system using thousands of Starlink satellite Internet devices donated by SpaceX. This included networks for information exchange, troop command and control, and, beginning in 2023, a control system for long-range sea and air drones. 

That said, the network wasn’t the most efficient for Ukraine’s long-range drone systems, simply because SpaceX does not officially operate in Russia, meaning drones would lose connectivity once they crossed into Russian territory. Moreover, the company’s founder and CEO, Elon Musk, previously ordered Starlink to disable coverage in Crimea to prevent Ukrainian forces from launching an attack on Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. Ukrainian units also reportedly lost access to their Starlink-equipped command-and-control system during the 2024 incursion into Russia’s Kursk region. 

Frontline Russian troops obtained contraband Starlink terminals, smuggled into Russia through Central Asia and the Persian Gulf, as early as 2023. Though the Defense Ministry never formally approved their use, “volunteers” have helped equip an increasing number of Russian units with these satellite Internet devices. 

As a result, frontline Russian soldiers have been able to stream drone footage to rear command posts, including unit headquarters far behind the front. These livestreams are typically conducted via Discord, a communications platform designed for gamers that Russia officially blocked in 2024. Starlink connections allowed them to circumvent official jamming, and the drone-to-headquarters broadcasts became the foundation of Russia’s probing tactics. Assault group commanders could monitor live drone footage and direct individual soldiers in real time, via radio or instant messages sent through Telegram — just like in a video game. 

Until now, Kyiv and SpaceX had failed to take decisive action against the Russian military’s unauthorized use of Starlink. This was likely due to the potential repercussions for Ukrainian forces, who have many more “unverified” terminals than the Russian side. In February 2024, then-digital transformation minister Mykhailo Fedorov explained that cutting off Starlink in frontline areas would be “catastrophic” for Ukraine’s drone operations. 

Since then, the situation has changed dramatically. In early February, Fedorov, who is now Ukraine’s defense minister, announced that Kyiv was working with SpaceX to disable all unauthorized Starlink terminals on Ukrainian territory. Ukrainian users would be able to register their devices for verification via an online system, he added.

Why did Russian forces turn to Starlink in the first place?

We must return to 2022. At the start of the full-scale invasion, military analysts assumed that Russia would have overwhelming air superiority. By all appearances, the Russian command assumed the same based on its success in Syria, where Russian air power turned the tide of the civil war in favor of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. 

The Russian military was expected to wipe out Ukraine’s air defenses in the very first days of the “” — a tactic U.S.-led coalition forces have used in 21st-century wars, before “finishing off” the enemy. (That said, Ukraine’s air defense system was significantly larger than any of those that U.S. forces have encountered.) Despite knocking out nearly half of Ukraine’s systems in the early days of the full-scale invasion, the Russian Aerospace Forces failed to achieve air superiority. In fact, by early March 2022, they had suffered such significant losses that Russia’s General Staff decided to halt aircraft missions in the Ukrainian rear.

Russian air power returned to the battlefield in late 2023, with bombers tens of kilometers from the front launching glide bombs guided by Glonass (the Russian equivalent of GPS). This is Russia’s version of the Pentagon’s Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) kits, which convert “dumb” bombs into precision-guided weapons. 

These guided bombs have effectively allowed Russian aircraft to prevent the concentration of Ukrainian troops along the front line. Meanwhile, Russia has used Iskander ballistic missiles to strike stationary targets in the rear. 

However, until recently, the Russian army lacked the means to strike mobile targets — especially relatively “low-value” ones that didn’t justify the cost of deploying expensive missiles. This allowed the Ukrainian army to move and supply entire frontline brigades by road and rail. Ukrainian air defense, aviation, and artillery forces, meanwhile, were concentrated in the immediate rear almost unhindered. Under standard U.S. military doctrine, air power would be used to locate and destroy these “assets.” But since Russia failed to suppress Ukraine’s air defenses, this wasn’t possible. 

The Russian command tried to resume strikes behind Ukraine’s frontline positions using expensive Lancet drones (and much more powerful Geran-2 attack drones) rigged with mobile modems and Ukrainian SIM cards. Ukraine countered this by filtering cellular traffic to detect and disable SIM cards moving at high speeds. 

Finally, in the fall of 2025, the Russian Defense Ministry’s specialized drone warfare unit, Rubicon, developed a new solution: mass-producing low-cost Molniya-2 fixed-wing drones retrofitted with both Starlink antennas and additional engines and batteries. This allowed them to hunt targets 20 to 80 kilometers (12.4 to 50 miles) behind Ukrainian lines. 

Russia also began using Geran drones equipped with Starlink antennas to strike military targets and transport infrastructure (including locomotives and trains) in the immediate rear. 

In recent weeks, Starlink-equipped drones were deployed in mass attacks on the Dnipro-Pokrovsk highway (a key artery for supplying Ukrainian forces in Donbas), used in attempted strikes on Ukrainian aircraft at airfields (one hit a mock F-16), and reportedly involved in the destruction of air defense systems and HIMARS launchers (with the help of an Iskander).

Against this backdrop, Fedorov appealed to Musk’s SpaceX for help. 

How exactly is SpaceX blocking Russian troops from accessing Starlink? 

First, as Musk and Fedorov reported, SpaceX is enforcing a speed limit for Starlink terminals in Ukraine. If a device exceeds 90 kilometers (56 miles) per hour for two minutes, it automatically reboots. (This effectively prevents Starlink from being used on high-speed attack drones.) 

Second — and most importantly — the Ukrainian Defense Ministry is working with SpaceX to deactivate any terminal in the country that hasn’t been registered on its official “whitelist.” Individual users can register one terminal online, but those with multiple devices must bring them to a government services center for in-person registration. This is to prevent pro-Russian collaborators from remotely registering terminals on behalf of the Russian military.

The registration process, which Musk has promoted, has already encountered difficulties. Since many of the Ukrainian military’s Starlink terminals were purchased by volunteers or soldiers with their own money, some feared that registration would be a prelude to the government seizing their devices (despite reassurances to the contrary). There have also been reports of technical problems when attempting to reconnect newly registered terminals, including complaints from soldiers. 

However, the Starlink cutoff is far more damaging to the Russian side. It disrupts not only their drone operations but also the command and control of units that have come to rely on unauthorized devices. That said, Starlink forms the backbone of the Ukrainian command system, which is precisely why the registration process, rather than a blanket shutdown, is essential.

So what does the cutoff mean for Russia’s frontline units? 

As noted above, both armies primarily use satellite connectivity to transmit live drone footage to commanders. This enables them to direct small assault squads and receive real-time intelligence from the field. 

Satellite links also help manage logistics under challenging conditions, where enemy drones monitor supply routes many kilometers behind the front lines. Without satellite channels to transmit heavy data loads, supplying frontline troops would be even more difficult. 

However, there are other high-speed Internet options. Before Starlink, Russian command posts (especially those located near Ukrainian territories occupied back in 2014–2015) used civilian fiber-optic networks and extended them to frontline positions. They’ve also created radio repeater networks to extend communication ranges. Both sides use relay drones to extend UAV ranges. 

These communications systems are, of course, far less convenient and more labor-intensive than commercial satellite networks.

Are there any Starlink alternatives for Russia?

There are only a few companies in the world that provide high-speed satellite Internet with low signal lag. Roughly a dozen others are at various stages of building their own networks, including Russia’s Starlink alternative, Rassvet (“Dawn”). 

However, the Russian project is far behind. Although it was expected to be online by 2027, production of the low-orbit satellites for the constellation hasn’t started yet. Russia’s existing civilian and military satellites are also unsuitable as alternatives to Starlink due to low Internet speeds, high signal latency, and insufficient bandwidth.

From a political perspective, China’s Starlink competitors may appear to be a viable alternative for the Russian military (even if their devices are smuggled into the country). However, even the country’s top project, the Shanghai-based “Thousand Sails” (Qianfan) network, has encountered problems. Launch delays in 2025 mean it’s unlikely to provide global coverage by 2027, as planned.