China’s sprint toward Taiwan invasion

When U.S. President Donald Trump met with Chinese President Xi Jinping late last month in South Korea, the leaders of the two rival superpowers shook hands, smiled, and showered each other with compliments. “He’s a tough negotiator,” Trump said of Xi, referring to the ongoing trade war with Beijing — a conflict that’s now on pause following the agreement reached at the summit — later calling him a “friend” and a “great leader of a great nation.”

Xi, for his part, praised Trump’s “significant contribution” to ending the war in Gaza. While admitting that China and the U.S. “don’t always see eye to eye,” he emphasized that cooperation between them was possible: “I have always believed that China’s development goes hand in hand with your vision of making America great again,” Xi told Trump.

The smiles and conciliatory words, however, mask growing tension. Just minutes before that summit, Trump announced in a post on his Truth Social network that he had instructed the Pentagon to resume nuclear testing — ending a 30-year moratorium — against the backdrop of China’s race to build a nuclear arsenal to match that of the U.S. and Russia, which is also developing modernized nuclear weapons.

China isn’t limiting itself to weapons of mass destruction. It’s rapidly upgrading its conventional military capabilities, with the declared goal of transforming the People’s Liberation Army into a “world-class military” by 2035. According to U.S. intelligence assessments, the Chinese military has an even earlier and more alarming target: to be ready for an invasion of Taiwan — the democratically governed island that Beijing claims as its own — by 2027.

At 72, Xi, who rose to power in 2012, is regarded as China’s most powerful ruler since the country’s communist founder Mao Zedong. He places great emphasis on military might. A decade ago, he launched sweeping reforms in the People’s Liberation Army, which, with its 2 million soldiers, is the largest in the world — but suffers from numerous shortcomings and a severe lack of combat experience, raising questions about its readiness for war. The last major military confrontation it fought was a short border war with Vietnam in 1979, in which Chinese forces suffered defeat.

Xi led major structural reforms within the army, including cutting reliance on ground forces, which were reduced by about 300,000 troops. He has worked to uproot corruption from within the ranks, launching broad purges that also removed officers deemed disloyal, while funneling enormous sums of money into upgrading military capabilities. Since Xi came to power, China’s official defense budget has more than doubled, reaching roughly $245 billion a year, though estimates suggest the true figure is significantly higher.

The U.S. defense budget remains roughly three times larger, but China is steadily narrowing the gap.

China’s defense spending is five times greater than Japan’s and seven times greater than that of South Korea, Washington’s two key allies in the region. The growing concern was voiced recently by Australian Defense Minister Richard Marles, who urged Beijing to explain what he called “the most significant military buildup and expansion of conventional capabilities by any nation since the end of World War II.”

Marles warned that the anxiety surrounding China’s rearmament continues to grow because Beijing offers no explanation for its intentions — no reassurance for its neighbors. “What we want to see,” he said in June, “is strategic transparency and reassurance from China — an understanding of why it requires such an extraordinary military buildup.”

Xi, of course, emphasizes in his public statements that he seeks cooperation and peace — yet consistently boasts of Beijing’s growing military power. “The great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is unstoppable!” he declared in a massive military parade at Tiananmen Square in Beijing this September. Standing beside him were Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, with whom he has strengthened military and economic ties in recent years.

At that parade — marking 80 years since the victory over imperial Japan in World War II — Xi issued a blunt warning to the West: “Today, humanity is once again faced with a choice between peace and war, between dialogue and confrontation, between cooperation that benefits all and a zero-sum game.”

He didn’t stop at rhetoric. During the parade, China unveiled an array of new weapons: robotic submarines, laser interception systems, and cruise missiles with hypersonic glide warheads capable of mid-flight maneuvers that make them extremely difficult to intercept. Such capabilities in the Indo-Pacific theater are particularly troubling to the United States, as they would enable China to target American warships and complicate Washington’s efforts to send aid or reinforcements to Taiwan in the event of an attack.

The parade also marked the first time China publicly revealed its “nuclear triad” — the ability to launch nuclear warheads from the sea, air, and land. Among the weapons showcased was the DF-5C intercontinental ballistic missile, equipped with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), meaning each warhead can strike a different target independently.

According to China, the missile’s range includes the continental United States. The state-run Global Times boasted that the weapon can hit “any point on Earth” and “stands ready at all times to ensure effective deterrence and prevent wars.”

The growing display of China’s nuclear capabilities reflects a dramatic expansion of its arsenal. In just five years, Beijing has doubled its number of nuclear warheads from 300 to 600. The Pentagon now estimates that China could possess more than 1,000 warheads by 2030.

While the U.S. still maintains a much larger stockpile — 5,177 warheads, compared to Russia’s 5,459 — China is closing the gap, both in the number of warheads and in its delivery systems.

A recent analysis by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), conducted after the Beijing military parade, warned that the U.S. is “losing the nuclear arms race.” The report said Washington has struggled to modernize its aging strategic nuclear forces, largely due to budget constraints.

“While Washington moves slowly,” the report read, “China and Russia are expanding their arsenals at a breathtaking pace. China’s nuclear triad is now more diverse than that of the United States, featuring five distinct delivery systems for nuclear weapons. The parade was a wake-up call — showing that China is bringing its nuclear arsenal out of the shadows to challenge the very foundations of U.S. strategic superiority.”

China has placed enormous emphasis on developing its missile forces, accelerating production by 50% in recent years. Last month, CNN published an investigation showing that this pace has continued through 2025. Based on satellite imagery, the report revealed that more than 60% of China’s 136 missile production facilities have been expanded since early 2020, covering an additional 2 million square meters of new construction, including plants, towers, and underground bunkers.

Entire villages, the report noted, have vanished from satellite photos to make way for these facilities.

“This is how China positions itself as a global superpower,” said William Alberque of the Pacific Forum think tank in the U.S. “China is already in a sprint — and it’s preparing for a marathon.”

President Xi has described the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force as “the strategic support for our nation’s status as a great power and a cornerstone of its national security.” Military analysts believe the Rocket Force would play a decisive role if Xi were to attempt to seize Taiwan by force.

An amphibious invasion of the island — 130 kilometers from mainland China at its narrowest point — would be a daunting task, given Taiwan’s natural defenses. Only 14 beaches are suitable for amphibious landings, and they are heavily fortified with U.S.-supplied defense systems.

As a result, many analysts believe China would first impose a blockade, aiming to choke Taiwan into submission, with its missiles taking center stage in such a scenario.

“China’s military wants to create the conditions for an invasion,” said David Avelat, an analyst at the CNA research institute. “That means striking ports, helicopter bases, supply hubs — anything that could help Taiwan hold out. These missiles could also serve to deter the U.S. from sending military aid.”

CNN noted that China’s surge in missile production accelerated after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, a war in which Beijing has officially remained “neutral” while quietly helping Moscow weather the Western sanctions and economic isolation. Like many other countries, China has closely observed the fighting in Ukraine, drawing lessons from what would be its first major military confrontation since 1979.

“They’re watching Ukraine very closely,” said William Alberque of the Pacific Forum. “They’re witnessing real combat between two highly trained, technologically advanced militaries — and they’re taking meticulous notes.”

One of Beijing’s main takeaways, Alberque said, is that the most efficient way to overwhelm Western air defenses is by flooding them with cheap weapons such as drones. Doing so would exhaust defensive systems and allow more advanced ballistic missiles to break through and strike their targets.

He added that China’s early war games once estimated it would need 5,000 to 10,000 missiles to defeat Taiwan — but after observing the Ukraine war, those estimates have “risen exponentially.”

This massive buildup coincides with reports of a shortage of U.S. interceptors, expensive systems that were depleted partly because Washington supplied some to Israel during its 12-day war with Iran.

American media have reported that 25% of the interceptors in the U.S.-made THAAD missile defense system, deployed in Israel, were used during that conflict. The THAAD system is a key component of America’s Indo-Pacific defense network, but production has struggled to keep pace: each interceptor costs $12.7 million and takes a long time to manufacture.

In contrast, China’s launch capabilities are far more diverse, said Collin Koh of Singapore’s IDSS think tank, speaking to Newsweek.

“Unlike Iran, which can only launch missiles from land — limiting the direction of attack — China can strike from multiple platforms. A Chinese missile barrage would be far more complex for Taiwan and the U.S. to counter. Even a combination of advanced air defense systems wouldn’t be enough to deter or neutralize Beijing’s threat.”

China’s military acceleration extends well beyond its missile program. The country is rapidly transforming its navy into a “blue-water fleet” — one capable of operating far from its shores, deep in the world’s oceans, and projecting global power.

In terms of ship numbers alone, China’s navy surpassed the U.S. Navy back in 2014 and continues to grow at a staggering rate. As of 2023, it boasted 332 vessels, compared to the U.S. Navy’s 291. According to projections by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), China’s fleet will expand by 48% by 2030.

Although still inferior to the U.S. Navy in combat experience and operational capabilities, China’s maritime forces are steadily narrowing the gap. In preparation for a potential invasion of Taiwan, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has staged increasingly complex drills near the island in recent years, including simulated encirclement exercises meant to rehearse a naval blockade.

The Pentagon has assessed that while China’s operational reach in the Indo-Pacific remains “modest,” it is expanding as the navy gains experience and technological sophistication.

Earlier this month, China officially launched its third aircraft carrier, the Fujian, the first to be designed and built entirely domestically. Its first two carriers were based on Soviet blueprints. The Fujian represents a significant leap forward in Chinese naval engineering and is expected to play a key role in any future conflict over Taiwan.

Analysts believe Beijing would deploy at least one carrier, possibly the Fujian itself, in the waters between Taiwan and U.S. military bases in the Pacific, particularly Guam, in an effort to deter Washington from sending reinforcements or supplies.

The Fujian incorporates several major technological upgrades, most notably an electromagnetic catapult system to launch aircraft. Unlike the older steam catapults used on most U.S. carriers, this system places less stress on aircraft, reducing wear and damage, and allows for the launch of heavier or more varied aircraft — including surveillance and early-warning planes.

“The Fujian is a major step forward for China,” said Brian Hart, deputy director of the CSIS “China Power Project.” “It can deploy more types of aircraft, carry more weapons, and operate more efficiently. It represents China’s growing confidence as a maritime power.”

Even so, the Fujian still lags far behind U.S. carriers. America currently operates 11 nuclear-powered carriers, each far larger, longer-ranged, and more capable. A CNN analysis found that Fujian can support only about 60% of the flight sorties that U.S. Nimitz-class carriers — some of which are 50 years old — can handle. The U.S. is also replacing the Nimitz fleet with the even more advanced Ford-class carriers.

Still, Beijing is not slowing down. Reports indicate that a fourth Chinese carrier is already under construction, incorporating lessons from Fujian’s design. China is also developing nuclear propulsion technology for its carriers.

“China is closing the gap in every dimension,” Hart added. “It’s building more carriers, launching more nuclear submarines, and deploying larger destroyers capable of carrying more missiles.”

China’s military modernization drive has not been without turbulence.

Beneath the gleaming parades and new weaponry, President Xi Jinping has waged a sweeping anti-corruption and loyalty purge across the upper echelons of the People’s Liberation Army — a campaign that has both consolidated his power and exposed deep dysfunction within the ranks.

Since taking power 13 years ago, Xi has dismissed or detained dozens of senior officers, many of whom he personally appointed. According to a tally by Bloomberg News, at least 14 of the 79 generals promoted by Xi have since been removed from their posts, including two defense ministers.

The most prominent of these was General He Weidong, the PLA’s second-highest-ranking officer, who vanished from public view in March and was confirmed last month to have been arrested on corruption charges, along with eight other generals — including the commander of China’s Rocket Force.

Beijing offered no details about the accusations, saying only that they involved “very large sums of money.”

A Bloomberg report from early 2024, citing U.S. intelligence assessments, suggested that Xi’s purge was driven by his fears that corruption could undermine military readiness, particularly within the Rocket Force — the branch responsible for China’s nuclear and missile arsenal.

The report included startling claims: some missiles had been filled with water instead of fuel, and launch silos suffered from defective blast doors. The revelations, if true, rattled Xi’s confidence in his forces’ reliability.

Washington analysts concluded that the corruption scandal had shaken Xi’s faith in his military’s combat readiness, making a major offensive less likely in the near term.

In a commentary for Foreign Affairs, Professor Taylor Fravel, director of the Security Studies Program at MIT, wrote that the continuing purges could cripple command efficiency and foster a “chilling effect” within the ranks.

“Officers at all levels may become increasingly risk-averse,” Fravel argued, “fearing that any misstep could put them in Xi’s crosshairs. That dynamic could reinforce the PLA’s existing tendency toward excessive centralization — making complex, multi-branch operations far more difficult to execute.”

Yet despite the questions about China’s readiness, experts warn that military capability alone may not determine whether Beijing strikes Taiwan.

Fravel and others note that China has initiated wars in the past, even when its army was far less prepared than it is today.

“If Xi believes that the recent purges have weakened his military’s readiness, an opportunistic use of force may seem less likely in the near term,” Fravel wrote. “But if he concludes that an attack on Taiwan has become necessary for China’s destiny, he will give the order regardless of those weaknesses.”

The lingering uncertainty now shifts to Washington’s response if China does invade.

After losing the Chinese Civil War in 1949, the defeated Republic of China government fled to Taiwan, establishing the democratic island while the Communist Party, under Mao Zedong, founded the People’s Republic of China on the mainland.

The U.S. recognized Taipei as the legitimate Chinese government for three decades — until 1979, when Washington normalized relations with Beijing and recognized the Communist government as the sole legitimate authority.

Since then, U.S.-Taiwan ties have remained unofficial but robust, with the Taiwan Relations Act obligating Washington to provide Taipei with the means to defend itself.

For decades, the U.S. has maintained a policy of “strategic ambiguity,” deliberately avoiding a clear commitment to defend Taiwan militarily in the event of invasion.

Former President Joe Biden appeared to break that precedent in 2022 when he declared that the United States “would respond militarily” if China attacked. But President Donald Trump, now serving his second term, has reverted to the old playbook of ambiguity.

When asked in an interview on 60 Minutes last week whether the U.S. would come to Taiwan’s defense, Trump replied: “I can’t reveal my secrets.”

Trump said the Taiwan issue had not come up during his recent summit with Xi in South Korea, but added that the Chinese leader and his circle had made one thing clear: they would not invade while Trump was in the White House.

“They know what the consequences would be,” Trump said cryptically. “You’ll find out if it happens. Xi understands what the answer will be.”

Trump’s carefully maintained ambiguity is unsettling U.S. allies from Asia to Europe, who worry that his “America First” doctrine could leave them exposed in the event of Chinese or Russian aggression.

A recent Politico report revealed that the newly renamed Department of War (formerly the Department of Defense) is drafting a national strategy paper that would refocus U.S. priorities on homeland defense and operations within the Western Hemisphere — placing them above deterrence missions against China or Russia.

According to officials familiar with the discussions, the shift represents a fundamental reordering of America’s global posture: Washington would focus more on countering regional threats like drug cartels and maritime smuggling while reducing its forward presence in Asia and Europe.

In fact, such a transition already appears to be underway.

In September, the U.S. military launched an extensive bombing campaign against “narco-ships” in the Caribbean, and this week the Pentagon deployed its most advanced Ford-class aircraft carrier to the same region.

“It’s going to be a major shift for the United States and its allies across several continents,” an insider told Politico. “The long-standing, reliable security guarantees that Washington once provided are now in question.”

Despite this apparent pivot inward, analysts say the U.S. cannot afford to abandon its interests in the Indo-Pacific, the world’s most strategically vital theater. Even with China’s meteoric rise, the U.S. remains the dominant military power in the region.

Retired Australian general Mick Ryan told CNN he still considers the U.S. military “the strongest in the world — though the margin is smaller than it used to be.”

David Santoro, head of the Pacific Forum think tank, warned of the dangers of escalation: “We’re already in a cold war,” Santoro said. “It’s present across every domain — economic, technological, and military. The real danger is that it turns into a hot one.”

Tensions surrounding Taiwan are now spilling into a full-blown diplomatic clash between China and Japan.

The spark came last week when Japan’s newly elected prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, was asked in parliament how Tokyo would respond if China launched a military invasion of Taiwan.

Her answer sent shockwaves through Beijing: “Such a scenario would threaten Japan’s survival,” she said, “and could therefore trigger a military response from us.”

China’s reaction was immediate and furious.

The Defense Ministry in Beijing warned that if Japan were to intervene militarily on Taiwan’s behalf, it would suffer a “crushing defeat.”

The Chinese government summoned the Japanese ambassador for a formal reprimand, accusing Takaichi of causing “serious damage” to bilateral relations.

“Japan must clearly understand its own history and not repeat its past mistakes,” the Chinese statement said — a pointed reference to Japan’s imperial expansion in Asia before and during World War II.

In Tokyo, the Foreign Ministry stood by Takaichi’s general stance, saying there was “no reason to retract her remarks.” But facing growing diplomatic pressure, the prime minister sought to soften the tone.

She told reporters that her comments were “purely hypothetical” and that she would avoid making similar statements in future parliamentary sessions.

Despite the attempt to calm tempers, the episode underlined the rapidly deteriorating security environment in East Asia, where the Taiwan question has become the defining flashpoint between the world’s great powers.

As the region braces for what analysts now call “the Pacific century’s defining showdown,” one warning echoes from Washington to Tokyo to Taipei:

Even 10,000 missiles might not be enough to stop the rise of China’s dragon.