Toplines
Russian President Vladimir Putin continued to threaten Europe as part of a multi-pronged informational effort to deter the West from responding to hostile Russian actions. Putin claimed on October 2 that Russia is closely monitoring the “militarization” of Europe and explicitly stated that Russia is “listening closely” to Germany regarding remarks that the German military should be the “most powerful in Europe.”[1] Putin claimed that “no one doubts” that Russia’s response to Europe’s “militarization” will not be “long in coming” and that Russia is evaluating whether Europe’s efforts are “just talk” or if Russia must take “countermeasures” that “will be very convincing.” Putin absurdly claimed that Russia has “never initiated a military confrontation” but suggested that competing with Russia militarily would “ultimately end badly for the provocateur.” Putin simultaneously downplayed the threat that Russia poses to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), claiming that European warnings of Russian aggression are “nonsense” and efforts to “whip up hysteria” within Europe. Putin called on European states to “calm down” about Russia and instead focus on domestic issues. Putin is attempting to dissuade European members of NATO from bolstering their own defensive efforts and providing military support for Ukraine, which both oppose Russia’s own strategic objectives, by posturing that Russia is only a threat to Europe as long as Europe resists Putin’s objectives.
Putin’s rhetoric follows the recent Russian and unidentified drone incursions into or within European airspace; Russian aerial overflights in or near European airspace and assets in violation of international safety norms; and Russian hybrid and sabotage operations against NATO military facilities and logistics.[2] Russia also aims to sow discord and fear within Europe through hybrid operations, including within Poland, Germany, and Lithuania.[3] Putin made these remarks during his annual speech at the Valdai Club, an international discussion forum where Kremlin officials, Russian scholars, and foreign officials and scholars meet to discuss international issues. The Valdai Club has served as a useful tool in the Kremlin’s decades-long efforts to influence Western policy in Russia’s favor.[4] Putin likely aimed to use his Valdai Club address as the venue for these remarks to ensure that his various informational efforts, including those targeting Europe, reach a broader audience and cumulatively achieve his desired effect: persuade the West against supporting Ukraine or protecting itself from Russia.
Putin attempted to discourage the United States from selling Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine by downplaying their effectiveness and indirectly threatening the United States. Putin warned the United States against selling Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine, calling the missiles “powerful” and “threatening.”[5] Putin noted Ukraine cannot operate Tomahawk missiles without the “direct participation of American military personnel” and that Ukraine’s use would mark a “new stage of escalation.” Putin also downplayed the Tomahawk missiles as “not entirely modern” and noted that the provision of these missiles to Ukraine “will not change the balance of power on the battlefield.”[6] ISW continues to assess that Ukraine has an operational requirement to strike important military infrastructure protected in Russia’s rear.[7]
Putin is attempting to exaggerate Russian advances in Ukraine to support the Kremlin’s false narrative that a Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable. Putin claimed on October 2 that Russian forces have seized two-thirds of Kupyansk.[8] ISW assesses that Russian forces have seized only 14 percent of Kupyansk as of October 2, and that Putin is exaggerating Russian gains in Kupyansk. Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov claimed on August 30 that Russian forces seized roughly 50 percent of Kupyansk, which ISW also assessed was an exaggeration of Russian gains in Kupyansk.[9] The Kremlin has been attempting to use large amounts of quantitative data to create the false impression that Russian forces are rapidly advancing on the battlefield.[10] Putin’s October 2 statements are a continuation of the ongoing Kremlin effort to hyperfocus on and exaggerate tactical Russian gains to falsely portray Russia as making rapid advances on the battlefield and to provide Russia with an informational victory in the war.[11] Putin is trying to convince the United States, Europe, and Ukraine that Russia will inevitably achieve its war goals militarily, such that Ukraine should concede to Russian demands and the West should therefore cease its support of Ukraine.
The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported that US President Donald Trump approved intelligence sharing with Ukraine for long-range strikes against legitimate military targets within Russia. WSJ reported on October 1, citing unnamed US officials, that Trump recently approved US intelligence agencies and the Pentagon to share intelligence with Ukraine for long-range strikes against energy infrastructure within Russia, and that the US is asking NATO allies to provide similar intelligence support.[12] It is currently unclear if this approval also extends to military targets within Russia. The US officials stated that the US is considering providing Tomahawk missiles, Barracuda missiles, or other ground- and air-launched missiles with ranges of roughly 500 miles, cohering with prior reports that the Trump administration was considering selling Tomahawks to Ukraine.[13]
To mitigate domestic panic over Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign against Russian oil refineries, Russian officials attempted to downplay the reported US decision to increase intelligence sharing with Ukraine. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on October 2 that US intelligence sharing with Ukraine is “not an innovation.”[14] Peskov also claimed that no weapon will be a “magic pill” for Ukraine.[15] Russian State Duma Defense Committee Member Andrei Kolesnik also claimed that the US has already been providing Ukraine with intelligence for long-range strikes.[16] Russian officials are likely attempting to avoid inflaming panic within Russian society, given that Ukraine’s strikes against oil refineries have spurred recent gasoline shortages.[17]
Russian military intelligence is likely conducting hybrid operations in Poland, Germany, and Lithuania to sow fear and discord within NATO states, following indications of a possible future Russian false-flag operation within Poland. Polish media, citing sources associated with the Polish Internal Security Agency (ABW) and Polish General Prosecutor’s Office, reported on October 2 that the Russian General Staff’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) may have orchestrated planned drone strikes within Poland, Germany, and Lithuania.[18] The ABW detained an alleged courier whom the GRU reportedly recruited on Telegram for transporting explosives in cans for food products, drone parts, and SIM cards between Lithuania, Poland, and Germany. Lithuanian authorities also discovered a cache of explosive-filled cans in a cemetery in Kaunas, and the GRU reportedly intended for actors to use the drones to drop the explosive-filled cans for the strikes. The ABW stated that it is still investigating the people and events. ISW previously assessed that Russia and Belarus may conduct special forces sabotage operations against critical infrastructure in Poland and launch additional drone incursions and blame Ukraine.[19]
Ukraine and Russia conducted another prisoner of war (POW) exchange in accordance with agreements reached during the June 2 bilateral negotiations in Istanbul. The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of POWs and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on October 2 that Ukraine received 185 Ukrainian POWs and 20 Ukrainian civilians and that Russia received 185 POWs and 20 Russian civilians.[20]
Key Takeaways
- Russian President Vladimir Putin continued to threaten Europe as part of a multi-pronged informational effort to deter the West from responding to hostile Russian actions.
- Putin attempted to discourage the United States from selling Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine by downplaying their effectiveness and indirectly threatening the United States.
- Putin is attempting to exaggerate Russian advances in Ukraine to support the Kremlin’s false narrative that a Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable.
- The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported that US President Donald Trump approved intelligence sharing with Ukraine for long-range strikes against legitimate military targets within Russia.
- To mitigate domestic panic over Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign against Russian oil refineries, Russian officials attempted to downplay the reported US decision to increase intelligence sharing with Ukraine.
- Russian military intelligence is likely conducting hybrid operations in Poland, Germany, and Lithuania to sow fear and discord within NATO states, following indications of a possible future Russian false-flag operation within Poland.
- Ukraine and Russia conducted another prisoner of war (POW) exchange in accordance with agreements reached during the June 2 bilateral negotiations in Istanbul.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Lyman and in the Dobropillya tactical area. Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Siversk, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka, and in northern Kharkiv Oblast, eastern Zaporizhia Oblast, and western Zaporizhia Oblast.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in The Russian Federation
Nothing Significant To Report.
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border
Russian forces continued offensive operations in Kursk and northern Sumy oblasts on October 2 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Bezsalivka (northwest of Sumy City on the international border).[21]
Russian forces attacked in Kursk and northern Sumy oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Andriivka, Varachyne, and Kindrativka and toward Khrapovshchyna and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka on October 1 and 2.[22] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Andriivka, Yunakivka, and Sadky (northeast of Sumy City).[23]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 810th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF]) are reportedly operating near Kindrativka.[24] Elements of the 382nd Separate Naval Infantry Battalion (810th Naval Infantry Brigade) reportedly unsuccessfully attempted to advance through an open field near Andriivka.[25]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City.
Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast.
Assessed Russian advance: Geolocated footage published on October 2 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of the Vovchansk Oil Extraction Plant in northwestern Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[26]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced on the left (south) bank of the Vovcha River in Vovchansk.[27]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Synelnykove, and Vovchanski Khutory on October 1 and 2.[28]
Ukrainian 2nd National Guard Corps Spokesperson Volodymyr Dehtyarev reported that Russian forces in northern Kharkiv Oblast typically only recover the bodies of Russian servicemembers killed in action (KIA) if the deceased servicemember held a rank above captain or relatives of deceased servicemembers pay the Russian military command.[29] Dehtyarev reported that Russian small infantry groups are attempting to seize positions near the international border between Hlyboke and Lukyantsi (both north of Kharkiv City), but are unsuccessful because Ukrainian forces have extended the kill zone (an area immediately near the frontline where a mass of tactical strike and reconnaissance drones pose an elevated risk to any equipment or personnel that enters the area). Ukrainian Northern Group of Forces Spokesperson Vadym Mysnyk reported that poorly trained Russian infantrymen continue to conduct daily assaults in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[30] Mysnyk reported that Russian forces’ tasks are often as simple as seizing a single building or industrial zone to gain footholds or produce footage exaggerating Russian advances.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on October 2 but did not advance.
A Russian source claimed that Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Ambarne on October 2.[31]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian Piratov Moryaka (Pirates of the Sea) Assault Detachment (7th Motorized Rifle Regiment, 11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Odradne (east of Velykyi Burluk).[32]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2
Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on October 2 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; north of Kupyansk near Holubivka; and northeast of Kupyansk near Novovasylivka, Bolohivka, and Kamyanka, and toward Kolodyazne on October 1 and 2.[33] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Holubivka and Kindrashivka (northwest of Kupyansk).[34]
Ukrainian Northern Group of Forces Spokesperson Vadym Mysnyk stated that Russian prisoners of war (POWs) captured in Kupyansk claim that the Russian military command ordered Russian forces to kill all civilian men and use women, children, and elderly residents as “human shields.”[35] Mysnyk also stated that Ukrainian forces observed Russian forces wearing civilian clothing in Kupyansk in what likely amounts to perfidy, a war crime under the Geneva Convention to which Russia is a signatory. Ukrainian 10th Army Corps (AC) Spokesperson Tetyana Branytska stated that Russian forces continue to use small group infiltration tactics in the Kupyansk direction.[36] Branytska added that Russian POWs reported that Russian forces do not recover the bodies of servicemembers killed in action (KIA) or evacuate wounded servicemembers. Branytska reported that Russian forces suffered significant losses during recent infiltration attempt in which Russian forces advanced into Kupyansk through an underground gas pipeline on September 12.[37]
The commander of a Ukrainian drone crew operating in the Kupyansk direction reported that rain and fog are degrading radio waves and affecting drone performance but that weather changes have not yet significantly impacted Russian tactics.[38] The commander noted that Russian forces use light vehicles as transport due to the sandy terrain of the direction. The commander reported that Ukrainian forces recently repelled a rare, roughly reinforced-platoon-sized Russian mechanized assault involving three tanks and two MT-LB armored fighting vehicles (AFVs). A Ukrainian drone unit operating in the Kupyansk direction published footage on October 2 showing Ukrainian forces destroying two tanks, two MT-LBs, and one other unspecified armored vehicle.[29] Kupyansk Raion Military Administration Head Andriy Kanashevych reported that Russian forces conducted a first-person view (FPV) drone strike that killed two civilians in Kupyansk.[40]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces with Groza Leska fiber-optic FPV drones near Kupyansk.[41]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on October 2 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Borivska Andriivka (northeast of Kupyansk).[42]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Bohuslavka and southeast of Borova near Olhivka and Hrekivka on October 1 and 2.[43]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 1 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northeastern Yampil (southeast of Lyman).[44]
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 30 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into northeastern Yampil and central Shandryholove (northwest of Lyman).[45]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced farther within and near Yampil than geolocated footage indicates.[46]
Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Shandryholove, Karpivka, Novoselivka, and Korovii Yar and toward Drobysheve; north of Lyman and toward Stavky and Novyi Myr; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Myrne; east of Lyman near Zarichne and Torske; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil and in the Serebryanske forest area on October 1 and 2.[47]
A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces have decreased the tempo of offensive operations since the summer of 2025, but that Russian drone and aerial operations remain intense.[48] The NCO stated that Russian forces are using Shahed, Molniya, and Lancet strike drones to target Ukrainian positions and logistics in the Lyman direction.
Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 20th CAA, (Central Military District [CMD]) reinforced by elements of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are fighting along the northern part of the Lyman direction and elements of the 25th CAA (CMD, reportedly under the administrative control of the MMD) are fighting in the southern part of the Lyman direction.[49] Mashovets stated that elements of the 20th CAA are attempting to reach the east (left) bank of the Siverskyi Donets River northwest of Lyman as the 25th CAA attempts to fix Ukrainian forces within its area of responsibility (AoR) rather than redeploy elsewhere, including to the 20th CAA’s AoR. Mashovets assessed that elements of the 20th CAA will continue to struggle to reach the east bank of the Siverskyi Donets River, however. Mashovets stated that Russian forces have concentrated about 80,000 to 90,000 personnel, 240 to 320 tanks, about 600 armored vehicles, 350 to 360 tube artillery systems, and up to 220 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) in the Lyman direction. Mashovets stated that this number of forces is roughly equivalent to the number of Russian forces concentrated in the Pokrovsk direction. Mashovets noted that both the 20th and 25th CAAs have formed battalions consisting mainly of Russian servicemembers that Russian authorities recruited in prison or coerced into military service to avoid prison.
Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that specialized drone elements of the Russian 10th and 16th Spetsnaz brigades (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) and Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies continue to operate in the Lyman direction.[50] Mashovets stated that elements of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, MMD) and 2nd Motorized Rifle Division are fighting near Karpivka, Serednie (northwest of Lyman), and Shandryholove.[51] Mashovets stated that elements of the 488th Motorized Rifle Regiment (144th Motorized Rifle Division) and elements of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division are fighting toward Stavky.[52] Mashovets stated that elements of the 67th Motorized Rifle Division (25th CAA) are fighting near Zarichne and, along with elements of its 164th and 169th motorized rifle brigades and elements of its 11th Tank Brigade, are fighting toward Yampil.[53]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 1 indicates that Russian forces recently entered the Donetsk Metallurgical Plant north of Siversk.[54]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Dronivka (northwest of Siversk).[55]
Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk near Dronivka; northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka; southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka and Vyimka; south of Siversk near Pereizne; and southwest of Siversk near Bondarne on October 1 and 2.[56]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on October 2 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in the forested areas near Volodymyrivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[57]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kostyantynivka near Minkivka, Orikhovo-Vasylivka, and Chasiv Yar; east of Kostyantynivka near Predtechyne and Oleksandro-Shultyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Toretsk, Shcherbynivka, Ivanopillya, and Pleshchiivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Volodymyrivka and Poltavka on October 1 and 2.[58]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are striking Ukrainian positions north of Rusyn Yar.[59] Drone operators of the 54th Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC], reportedly under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) are operating near Shcherbynivka.[60] Elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue to operate near Chasiv Yar.[61] Drone operators of the 57th Spetsnaz Company (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly coordinating with elements of an unspecified artillery anti-aircraft battalion of the 3rd Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) to strike Ukrainian positions near Volodymyrivka.[62] Drone operators of the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) and elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) are operating near Novopavlivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[63] Drone operators of the Gorynych Anti-Terrorist Unit (Federal Security Service [FSB], Presidential Regiment) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka direction.[64] Drone operators of the 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles in the Kostyantynivka tactical area.[65]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 2 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently liberated Dorozhnie (southeast of Dobropillya).[66]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Pankivka (east of Dobropillya).[67]
Geolocated footage published on October 2 indicates that Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration attempt along a windbreak north of Zolotyi Kolodyaz (northeast of Dobropillya).[68] ISW assesses that this event was not tied to an attempt to advance the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).
Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya near Hruzke, east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and Nove Shakhove, and southeast of Dobropillya near Ivanivka and Bilytske on October 1 and 2.[69] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Shakhove.[70]
Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on October 1 that Ukrainian forces established control over 2.2 square kilometers in the Dobropillya tactical area and conducted “shock and search” operations to clear three square kilometers of Russian forces.[71] Syrskyi reported that Ukrainian forces advanced 100 to 1,400 meters in unspecified areas of the Dobropillya tactical area. Syrskyi stated that Ukrainian forces have, in total, liberated 177.8 square kilometers and cleared 198.9 square kilometers of the Dobropillya tactical area.
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 3rd Spetsnaz Brigade (GRU) are reportedly operating in the Dobropillya tactical area.[72]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.
Assessed Russian advance: Geolocated footage published on October 1 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Balahan (east of Pokrovsk).[73]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Kotlyne and Udachne (both southwest of Pokrovsk).[74]
Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Krasnyi Lyman, Novoekonomichne, and Sukhetske; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka, Novotoretske, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Novopavlivka and Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Molodetske, and Zvirove on October 1 and 2.[75]
An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces continue to take advantage of warm weather and foliage with small infantry group infiltration tactics.[76] The officer reported that poor fall weather conditions will hinder Russian attacks as they degrade the performance of both reconnaissance and strike drones, including fiber optic first-person view (FPV) drones, that target Ukrainian logistics.
Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.
Assessed Russian advance: Geolocated footage published on October 2 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into central Zelenyi Hai (southwest of Novopavlivka).[77]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka and Biliakivka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove; south of Novopavlivka near Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Novokhatske, Tovste, and Zelenyi Hai on October 1 and 2.[78]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on October 2 but did not make confirmed advances.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Andriivka-Klevtsove and Piddubne; east of Velykomykhailivka near Sichneve and Voskresenka; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Komyshuvakha, Sosnivka, Vorone, and Berezove; south of Velykomykhailivka near Kalynivske; and southwest of Velykomykhailivka toward Oleksiivka on October 1 and 2.[79]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (GRU) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Velykomykhailivka and Pidhavrylivka (northeast of Velykomykhailivka).[80]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 1 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Novoivanivka (northeast of Hulyaipole).[81] Geolocated footage published on October 1 indicates that Russian forces advanced in central and western Novoivanivka, likely on a prior date.[82]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Novoivanvivka.[83]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Novohryhorivka, Olhivske, and Poltavka and toward Novovasylivske on October 1 and 2.[84]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets near Nove (northeast of Hulyaipole).[85] Drone operators of the Russian 143rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles near Novoivanivka.[86]
Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 1 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southeastern Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv).[87]
Russian forces attacked south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka, southwest of Orikhiv near Lobkove and Pyatykhatky, and west of Orikhiv near Plavni and Stepnohirsk on October 1 and 2.[88]
The commander of a Ukrainian unit operating in the Zaporizhia direction reported that Russian forces continue to leverage weather and terrain to conduct small infantry infiltration missions.[89]
Russian forces continued limited assaults in the Kherson direction on October 2 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked in the Kherson direction, including toward the Antonivsky Bridge (east of Kherson City), on October 1 and 2.[90]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating in the Dnipro (Kherson) direction.[91]
An OSINT analyst reported on X (formerly Twitter) that the Russian military command transferred elements of the 1430th Motorized Rifle Regiment (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) from south of Orikhiv to the Kherson direction to replace elements of the 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet), which the Russian military command transferred to Pokrovsk in September 2025.[92] The OSINT analyst noted that the 1430th Motorized Rifle Regiment has conducted minimal offensive operations since early 2024.
Ukrainian strikes continue to degrade Russian military capabilities in occupied Ukraine. Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk reported on October 2 that the ongoing gas shortages in Russia could disrupt the functioning and capabilities of Russia’s military infrastructure in occupied Crimea.[93] Pletenchuk also reported that Russian forces are struggling to use the railway in the occupied areas of southern Ukraine. Pletenchuk reported that Russian forces will likely be affected by fuel shortages, especially as Russian fuel production has fallen by roughly 25 percent.
Russian authorities attempted to excuse ongoing power issues at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). ZNPP occupation director Yuri Chernichuk claimed on October 2 that Russian authorities would repair two backup generators at the ZNPP in the “coming hours” and blamed power supply disruptions on the difficulties associated with the plant’s position near the frontline.[94]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of October 1 to 2. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 86 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones from the directions of Bryansk and Oryol cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Millerovo, Rostov Oblast.[95] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 53 drones and that 31 drones impacted six locations. Ukrainian officials reported that the strikes damaged residential infrastructure in Kharkiv Oblast, railway infrastructure in Sumy Oblast, energy and residential infrastructure in Odesa Oblast, and railway infrastructure in Kyiv Oblast, and injured 13 civilians in total.[96]
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported on October 1 that Ukraine’s Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant (CNPP) experienced power fluctuations after it lost connection to the Slavutych substation.[97] The IAEA noted that authorities switched to alternate lines to restore power except for the New Safe Confinement (NSC), which covers the old sarcophagus from the 1986 Chernobyl accident. ISW observed reports that Russian forces conducted drone strikes against the CNPP on February 14 that similarly disrupted the facility’s power supply.[98]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Belarus is contemplating increasing domestic oil refining production capacity, likely to supplement Russia amid its worsening gas shortages in Russia and occupied Ukraine.[99] Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko held closed-door meetings on October 2 with unspecified parties to discuss increasing Belarusian oil refining capacity.[100]
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/78134
[2] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-11-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-18-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-19-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-26-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-1-2025/
[3] https://suspilne dot media/1129158-u-polsi-zatrimali-agenta-rf-akij-gotuvav-terakti-na-teritorii-kraini-a-takoz-u-litvi-ta-nimeccini/ ; https://www.rmf24 dot pl/fakty/polska/news-co-rosja-szykowala-w-polsce-tam-ukrywano-materialy-wybuchowe,nId,8026633
[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-30-2025/; https://valdaiclub dot com/about/valdai/ ; https://miamioh.edu/cas/centers-institutes/havighurst-center/additional-resources/putins-russia/valdai-discussion-club.html ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-7-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-5-2023 ; https://fsi9-prod.s3.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2024-05/actionplan_3.0_5-14-2024_final3_update.pdf
[5] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/news/2025/10/02/1143916-putin-nazval-tomahawk; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/10/02/putin-esli-ukraina-primenit-rakety-tomagavk-eto-navredit-otnosheniyam-rossii-i-ssha
[6] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/news/2025/10/02/1143916-putin-nazval-tomahawk; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/10/02/putin-esli-ukraina-primenit-rakety-tomagavk-eto-navredit-otnosheniyam-rossii-i-ssha
[7] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/putins-safe-space-defeating-russias-kharkiv-operation-requires-eliminating-russias
[8] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/78134; https://t.me/tass_agency/341622
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-30-2025/
[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-30-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-29-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-18-2024/
[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-25-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-30-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-16-2025/
[12] https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/u-s-to-provide-ukraine-with-intelligence-for-missile-strikes-deep-inside-russia-ca7b2276
[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-16-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-14-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-11-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-30-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-29-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-28-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-23-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-26-2025
[14] https://t.me/tass_agency/341467
[15] https://t.me/tass_agency/341555; https://t.me/tass_agency/341558; https://t.me/tass_agency/341566
[16] https://lenta dot ru/news/2025/10/02/energetika/
[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-1-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-27-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-29-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-25-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-11-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-september-8-2025/
[18] https://www.rmf24 dot pl/fakty/polska/news-co-rosja-szykowala-w-polsce-tam-ukrywano-materialy-wybuchowe,nId,8026633; https://warszawa.wyborcza dot pl/warszawa/7,54420,32291943,wyborcza-ujawnia-rosyjski-wywiad-materialy-wybuchowe-w-puszkach.html#s=S.MT-K.C-B.1-L.1.duzy; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/10/02/wyborcza-rossiyskie-spetssluzhby-gotovili-diversii-v-polshe-germanii-i-litve-s-ispolzovaniem-dronov-i-banok-iz-pod-kukuruzy-v-kotoryh-byla-vzryvchatka
[19] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-30-2025/
[20] https://t.me/Koord_shtab/15378; https://t.me/mod_russia/57191
[21] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34478
[22] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29734; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29706; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29704; https://t.me/severnnyi/5261; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34478
[23] https://t.me/severnnyi/5254; https://t.me/wargonzo/29583
[24] https://t.me/severnnyi/5254
[25] https://t.me/severnnyi/5261
[26] https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/1973766249806200972; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1973768800614138066; https://t.me/soniah_hub/12570
[27] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34440
[28] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29734; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29706; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29704; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/19236; https://t.me/severnnyi/5254
[29] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/10/02/chornyj-rynok-z-povernennya-til-na-pivnochi-harkivshhyny-rosiyany-vyvozyat-trupy-svoyih-zagyblyh-za-groshi/
[30] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/10/02/krytychnyh-prosuvan-voroga-u-vovchansku-nemaye-syly-oborony-povnistyu-kontrolyuyut-sytuacziyu/
[31] https://t.me/tass_agency/341427
[32] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/181659
[33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29734; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29706; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29704; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/19236; https://t.me/wargonzo/29583; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/181699
[34] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/14281
[35] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/10/02/u-nyh-ye-nakaz-rozstrilyuvaty-czyvilne-naselennya-rosiyany-vbyvayut-cholovikiv-i-prykryvayutsya-ditmy-yak-shhytom/; https://youtu.be/OO-eTxpSFpY
[36] https://youtu.be/OO-eTxpSFpY; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/10/02/gazova-truba-cze-buv-shlyah-v-odyn-kinecz-u-kupyansku-rosiyany-zaznaly-kolosalnyh-vtrat/
[37] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-13-2025/
[38] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6Xx4L5hkwyw; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/10/02/tank-vrazyly-pryamo-v-lyuk-poblyzu-kupyanska-artyleriya-i-drony-rozbyly-mehanizovanyj-shturm/
[39] https://t.me/usf_army/1006
[40] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1129202-26-veresna-u-kupansku-vid-ataki-fpv-drona-zaginuli-colovik-i-zinka/ ; https://www.facebook.com/100000966914164/posts/31702910832657735/?rdid=P2uJFVeRbKo3LdEq#
[41] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/100878
[41] https://t.me/wargonzo/29583
[43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29706; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29704; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/19236; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29734
[44] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1973461127213552089 ; https://t.me/pekhno_news/20389
[45] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1973446163451052492; https://www.instagram.com/stories/special_assault_company/3733320420792219446/ ; https://x.com/blinzka/status/1973682254229688339 ; https://t.me/kalashgroup3/117
[46] https://t.me/wargonzo/29583; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/100838;
[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29734; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29706; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29704; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/19236; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/100838; https://t.me/wargonzo/2958
[48] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/10/02/zachystyly-pozycziyi-vid-zablukalyh-poblyzu-lymanu-rosiyany-zapolonyly-nebo-barazhuyuchymy-boyeprypasamy/
[49] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3015
[50] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3015
[51] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3016
[52] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3016
[53] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3016
[54] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1973490439153156546; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1973494381220118584; https://t.me/apachi_fpv/477
[55] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34470
[56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29734 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29706; ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29704 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/19236 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/29583 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34470
[57] https://t.me/wargonzo/29583
[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29734 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29706 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29704 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/19236 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/24972
[59] https://t.me/zov_kam/19872; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1973704539971973430
[60] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1973528589070131628 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1973413356255027598 ; https://t.me/nebesnij_artist_svo/160
[61] https://t.me/epoddubny/24972
[62] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14366
[63] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14368 ; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1973774048170811699
[64] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/181658
[65] https://t.me/epoddubny/24977
[66] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10139; https://t.me/SolovievLive/339362; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1973659243808235557
[67] https://t.me/wargonzo/29583; https://t.me/divgen/73368
[68] https://t.me/krulaomegu/1000; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10138
[69] https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/19236 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29734 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29706 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29704 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/29583
[70] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/181619
[71] https://t.me/osirskiy/1283
[72] https://t.me/rusich_army/26091; https://t.me/SolovievLive/339362
[73] https://t.me/argus38/686; https://x.com/giK1893/status/1973513643271791085; https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/1973441402580378070; https://t.me/kyianyn204/3684
[74] https://t.me/wargonzo/29583
[75] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29734; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29706; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29704; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/19236; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1973501746719883342
[76] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lnrp2S2L6qk; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/10/02/taktyky-buly-pidvyazani-pid-teplu-pogodu-rosiyanam-pid-pokrovskom-dovedetsya-vygaduvaty-shhos-nove/
[77] https://x.com/richardzai38580; https://t.me/opforukraine/207
[78] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29734; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29706; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29704; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/19236
[79] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29734; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29706; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29704; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/19236
[80] https://t.me/voin_dv/17092; https://t.me/voin_dv/17077
[81] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10137; https://t.me/pidrozdilshadowoficial/739
[82] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10137; https://t.me/pidrozdilshadowoficial/739;
[83] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/181712; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/67882
[84] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/100868; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/67882; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29734; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29706; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29704; https://t.me/tass_agency/341398 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/29583
[85] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/181700; https://t.me/voin_dv/17089
[86] https://t.me/voin_dv/17090
[87] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1973764422058627448; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1973764426374463673; https://t.me/polk_210/3927
[88] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34439; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29734; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29706; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29704
[89] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/10/02/ne-doyihav-ne-doviz-na-zaporizkomu-napryamku-dronari-pid-korin-rizhut-logistyku-vorozhoyi-pihoty
[90] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29734; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29706; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29704
[91] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34447
[92] https://x.com/WarUnitObserver/status/1973707351871152225
[93] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/10/02/deficzyt-bude-i-u-vijskah-u-vms-rozpovily-pro-palyvni-problemy-okupantiv-u-krymu/
[94] https://t.me/tass_agency/341452; https://t.me/tass_agency/341451
[95] https://t.me/kpszsu/43623
[96] https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/25169; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/10/02/vorog-vdaryv-iskanderom-po-balakliyi-zagynula-88-richna-zhinka-shhe-desyat-otrymaly-poranennya/ ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1128626-rosiani-vdarili-raketou-po-centru-balaklii-na-harkivsini-e-zagibla-ta-poraneni/ ; https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/25169 ; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/47812; https://suspilne dot media/1128716-na-caes-buv-blekaut-cerez-rosijski-obstrili-pereboi-zi-svitlom-buli-v-kilkoh-regionah-1317-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1759389953&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://t.me/synegubov/17500; https://t.me/synegubov/17498; https://t.me/astrapress/93606; https://t.me/Mykola_Kalashnyk/7270; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/50555; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/10/02/vorog-atakuvav-buchu-vynykla-pozhezha-ye-postrazhdalyj/; https://t.me/astrapress/93657; https://t.me/OleksiiKuleba/7179; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/50563; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/10/02/rosiya-vdaryla-po-depo-ukrzaliznyczi-v-odesi/ ; https://suspilne dot media/1128790-rf-zavdala-udaru-po-zaliznicnij-infrastrukturi-ukraini-postrazdalo-odeske-depo-ta-sumsina/ ; https://t.me/OleksiiKuleba/7181 ; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1128800-dvoe-ludej-travmovani-pid-cas-masovanoi-ataki-dronami-na-odesu/; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1128808-v-odesi-pisla-nicnoi-ataki-bez-svitla-zalisautsa-ponad-46-tisac-spozivaciv/?utm_source=telegram&utm_medium=ps ; https://www.dtek-oem.com dot ua/ua/news/situaciya-zi-svitlom-na-ranok-2-zhovtnya
[97] https://x.com/iaeaorg/status/1973470935815487520
[98] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-17-2025/
[99] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-1-2025/
[100] https://t.me/pul_1/18514
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