Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 27, 2025

Jessica Sobieski, Justin Young, Christina Harward, Anna Harvey, Kateryna Stepanenko, and George Barros with Nate Trotter

August 27, 2025, 6:30pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on August 27. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 28 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Limited Russian tactical forces recently infiltrated Ukrainian defenses in two border settlements in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast but have not established enduring positions in the area. The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian Dnipro Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on August 27 that Ukrainian forces stopped Russian advances in Zaporizske (3.75 kilometers from the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border) and Novoheorhiivka (730 meters from the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border) but that Russian forces are operating within both settlements and have not yet secured positions.[1] The Ukrainian military officials reported that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in Zaporizske and Novoheorhiivka. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on August 20 and 25 that elements of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) seized Novoheorhiivka and Zaporizske, respectively.[2] It is premature to characterize these reported advances as a breakthrough into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast as the activity is at most a small-scale infiltration. It is also inaccurate to characterize these reported advances as Russia‘s “first“ territorial gains in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, especially as Russian forces entered Dnipropetrovsk Oblast long before the Russian MoD claimed the seizures of Zaporizske and Novoheorhiivka. ISW observed geolocated footage in June and July 2025 that indicated that Russian forces had advanced in Dachne and Maliivka (both northeast of Zaporizske and Novoheorhiivka), and geolocated footage from August 25 further indicated that Russian forces had advanced in Vorone (west of Maliivka).[3] ISW assessed in November 2024 that the Russian military command would likely advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast in order to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) that support Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast and attempt to envelop these positions.[4] Russian forces may also be trying to advance in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast to set conditions for further operations in the region.

Russian forces are using infiltration tactics in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast similar to those they used near Dobropillya (northwest of Pokrovsk) in early August 2025. Trehubov reported that Russian forces are operating in small groups of five servicemembers, who infiltrate behind Ukrainian lines, wait and accumulate, and then attack in different directions simultaneously.[5] Trehubov specifically noted that Russian tactics in Zaporizske and Novoheorhiivka are similar to those that Russian forces employed near Dobropillya, and ISW has observed reports that Russian forces have been increasingly adopting these tactics throughout the frontline.[6] Russian forces recently infiltrated east and northeast of Dobropillya but have been unsuccessful in establishing enduring positions and exploiting the penetration thus far.[7] Such infiltration tactics also appear to be vulnerable to well-organized Ukrainian counterattacks.[8] ISW’s Assessed Russian Advances map layer notably only shows the Russian Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT) and does not differentiate between enduring Russian positions and limited infiltration missions.[9] Russian forces are likely using infiltration tactics that do not automatically result in enduring positions, and Russian actors often leverage maps that attempt to show these movements to exaggerate the presence of meaningful Russian activity on the battlefield.

The Kremlin appears to be resuming its drone and missile strike campaign targeting Ukraine’s energy infrastructure ahead of Winter 2025, likely in an effort to undermine Ukrainian will to resist Russian aggression. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 95 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea on the night of August 26 to 27.[10] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 74 drones over northern, southern and eastern Ukraine and that 21 drones struck nine locations. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Russian strikes caused power outages in Poltava, Sumy, and Chernihiv oblasts, leaving more than 100,000 households without electricity.[11] The Ukrainian Ministry of Energy stated that Russian strikes damaged a critical electrical substation in Sumy City and gas transportation infrastructure facilities in Poltava Oblast.[12] The Ministry of Energy added that Ukrainian authorities consider the strikes to be a continuation of the Russian campaign to destroy Ukrainian energy infrastructure on the eve of the heating season. Ukrainian officials stated that Russian strikes also de-energized water utilities in Sumy City and damaged an electrical substation in Novhorod-Siverskyi, Chernihiv Oblast; a school in Kharkiv Oblast, and an apartment building in Kherson City.[13] Ukraine’s largest private energy company, DTEK, reported that a Russian strike on August 26 destroyed the DTEK coal enrichment plant in Donetsk Oblast, which prepares coal for heating.[14]

The Kremlin is attempting to undermine US and European joint efforts to determine appropriate security guarantees for Ukraine by seemingly demanding that Russia and the United States privately discuss such matters. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on August 27 that the Kremlin does not want to publicly discuss the issue of Western security guarantees for Ukraine and called such public discussions “unhelpful.”[15] Peskov also stated that Russia takes a “negative view” of European proposals of security guarantees for Ukraine and that Russia will perceive European force deployments to postwar Ukraine as an expansion of NATO’s presence.[16] Peskov’s statement was likely in response to the August 26 Financial Times (FT) report that the United States is reportedly willing to supply supporting assets to a European-led force grouping as part of postwar security guarantees for Ukraine.[17] Peskov’s rejection of the Western proposals for security guarantees and his efforts to discredit public discussions of these proposals are likely part of the Kremlin’s efforts to demand that Russia have a veto over any Western security guarantees for Ukraine and to sideline Ukraine’s European partners from providing Ukraine robust security guarantees as part of a conflict termination agreement.[18]

The Kremlin signaled that Russian President Vladimir Putin remains unwilling to meet with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky unconditionally. Peskov reiterated a recurrent Kremlin excuse that any Russia-Ukraine contacts at a high or top level require extensive preparations, but that the heads of the Russian and Ukrainian negotiating groups remain in contact.[19] Peskov added that Russia and Ukraine have not scheduled the next round of talks between their negotiating groups. Peskov attempted to shift blame onto Ukraine for the Kremlin’s unwillingness to organize a Putin-Zelensky bilateral meeting by claiming that the resolution of the war requires “reciprocity from Kyiv.”

Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev reiterated Azerbaijan’s continued support for Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty and condemned the Soviet Red Army for “invading and occupying” Azerbaijan in 1920 — further aggravating already deteriorating Russian-Azerbaijani relations. Aliyev stated in an interview with Saudi Arabian state-owned outlet Al Arabiya published on August 27 that “the Russian army invaded Azerbaijan and occupied the country” in 1920.[20] Aliyev stated that Azerbaijan had “created [its] own state, but the Bolsheviks took it away.” Aliyev also notably characterized Russia’s war against Ukraine as an “invasion” and reiterated that Azerbaijan has supported Ukraine’s territorial integrity since the start of the full-scale invasion. Aliyev recalled the “recent cooling” of Russian-Azerbaijani relations, stating that Azerbaijan will “never tolerate” any “aggression or disrespect” against Azerbaijan. Aliyev stated that Russia’s downing of the Azerbaijan Airlines plane in December 2024 and the Kremlin’s reaction are “causing great disappointment and discontent” in Azerbaijan. Russian-Azerbaijani relations have been declining since a Russian air defense system shot down an Azerbaijan Airlines flight 8243 over the Republic of Chechnya in December 2024, causing the plane to crash in Kazakhstan.[21] Aliyev publicly rejected the Kremlin’s attempts to cover up Russia’s role in the days following the incident.[22] Russian-Azerbaijani relations continued to decline in June and July 2025 over small-scale incidents that Aliyev seized upon to reiterate his demands that Russia take responsibility for the plane crash.[23] Russian forces conducted a Shahed drone strike against the Ukrainian gas compressor station in Odesa Oblast that transports Azerbaijani gas overnight on August 5 to 6 and struck the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijani Republic (SOCAR) oil depot in Odesa City overnight on August 7 to 8.[24]

Key Takeaways:

• Limited Russian tactical forces recently infiltrated Ukrainian defenses in two border settlements in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast but have not established enduring positions in the area.
• Russian forces are using infiltration tactics in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast similar to those they used near Dobropillya (northwest of Pokrovsk) in early August 2025.
• The Kremlin appears to be resuming its drone and missile strike campaign targeting Ukraine’s energy infrastructure ahead of Winter 2025, likely in an effort to undermine Ukrainian will to resist Russian aggression.
• The Kremlin is attempting to undermine US and European joint efforts to determine appropriate security guarantees for Ukraine by seemingly demanding that Russia and the United States privately discuss such matters.
• The Kremlin signaled that Russian President Vladimir Putin remains unwilling to meet with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky unconditionally.
• Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev reiterated Azerbaijan’s continued support for Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty and condemned the Soviet Red Army for “invading and occupying” Azerbaijan in 1920 — further aggravating already deteriorating Russian-Azerbaijani relations.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Borova, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk and in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

 Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Unspecified actors likely conducted an attack against the key oil pipeline that supplies Moscow City in Ryazan Oblast on August 26. Sources in the Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) told Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne on August 27 that local Ryazan Oblast forums reported an explosion and subsequent fire on a section of the Ryazan-Moscow oil pipeline.[25] Suspilne reported that law enforcement agencies and repair crews are currently working near the village of Bozhatkovo, Ryazan Oblast, to respond to the emergency situation of the explosion and fire. GUR sources stated that Russian state-controlled petroleum company Transneft, which supplies the Russian military, repurposed the pipeline in 2018 to transport automobile gasoline. GUR sources reported that the explosion indefinitely halted transfers of petroleum to Moscow City via the pipeline.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Sumy direction on August 27 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Bezsalivka (northwest of Sumy Oblast).[26]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Sumy City near Bezsalivka; northeast of Sumy City near Varachyne, Oleksiiivka, and Yunakivka; and in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on August 26 and 27.[27] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bezsalivka; northeast of Sumy City near Oleksiivka and Andriivka and from the Sadky direction; and from the Marine direction (northeast of Sumy City).[28]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that elements of 1st Battalion of the 237th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (76th VDV Division) are struggling to conduct rotations in Yunakivka and can only leave the settlement via its eastern outskirts through an open field.[29] The milblogger claimed that the military command of the 1434th Akhmat-Chechnya Regiment is continuing to commit the attached V company (22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment, 72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), which was transferred to the regiment’s command, into grinding assaults to regain lost positions near Varachyne.[30] The milblogger noted that elements of the 83rd Separate VDV Brigade became combat ineffective after marginally advancing from the eastern side of Varachyne and that the brigade does not have sufficient reserves for offensive operations. The milblogger added that elements of the 83rd VDV Brigade are also unsuccessfully attacking on the western outskirts of Yunakivka.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are operating in Sumy Oblast.[31] Elements of the 51st VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly laying mines remotely and assuming defensive positions near Sadky.[32]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 27 but did not make confirmed advances. 

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced within Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[33]

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Synelnykove on August 26 and 27.[34]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on August 27 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced toward Khatnie (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[35]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Kanada Detachment (204th Akhmat Spetsnaz Regiment) and the 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Ambarne (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[36]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on August 27 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Blahodativka (west of Kupyansk) and west of Stroivka (north of Kupyansk near the international border).[37]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; north of Kupyansk toward Kolodyazne and Doroshivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on August 26 and 27.[38]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 25th Motorized Rifle Brigade (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and the 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Kindrashivka (north of Kupyansk).[39] Elements of the 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], LMD) are reportedly operating near Stepova Novoselivka.[40]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Borivska Andriivka (northeast of Borova).[41]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova toward Nova Kruhlyakivka and southeast of Borova toward Olhivka on August 26 and 27.[42]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Yastreb group of the Russian 252nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA, MMD) are striking Ukrainian forces southwest of Novovodyane (southeast of Borova).[43]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on August 27 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in western Novomykhailivka (north of Lyman) and in northern Shandryholove (northwest of Lyman).[44]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Shandryholove; north of Lyman near Novomykhailivka, Karpivka, Ridkodub and Zelena Dolyna and toward Stavky and Novyi Myr; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Myrne; east of Lyman near Zarichne and Torske; and southeast of Lyman toward Yampil on August 26 and 27.[45] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novomykhailivka.[46]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on August 27 that Russian forces recently changed tactics and are now accumulating forces to assault Ukrainian positions in small groups from multiple directions.[47] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces outnumber Ukrainian forces in some areas of the Lyman direction six to one. A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces in the area — as on most of the frontline — are attempting to bypass Ukrainian forward positions in order to enter the Ukrainian near rear and accumulate forces.[48] The NCO stated that Russian forces are leveraging fiber-optic first-person-view (FPV) drones to try to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and Shahed drones to strike frontline cities.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near the junction of the administrative boundaries of Donetsk, Luhansk, and Kharkiv oblasts (northeast of Lyman).[49]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on August 27 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk toward Dronivka and Zakitne; northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebryanka; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; and southwest of Siversk near Fedorivka on August 26 and 27.[50] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Serebryanka.[51]

A Russian milblogger claimed on August 27 that Russian forces began assaults on Dronivka and that seizing the settlement would allow Russian forces to enter Siversk from the northern outskirts and undermine Ukrainian defenses in this area.[52] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are conducting constant drone strikes against Siversk and are primarily focusing on striking high-rise buildings on the outskirts of the settlement.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Bilohorivka and Serebryanka (both northeast of Siversk).[53]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on August 27 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on August 27 that Russian forces advanced southwest of Maiske (northeast of Chasiv Yar).[54]

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar toward Stupochky on August 26 and 27.[55]

Order of Battle: Sniper groups of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar, and drone operators of the 98th VDV reportedly conducted a fiber-optic drone strike against a road near Kostyantynivka (southwest of Chasiv Yar).[56]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 26 indicates that Russian forces, including elements of the Vladikavkaz Rifle Battalion and other elements of the 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD), seized Katerynivka (northwest of Toretsk).[57] A Russian milblogger claimed that the 68th Tank Regiment is conducting clearing operations in Katerynivka.[58] Footage geolocated on August 27 indicates that Russian forces advanced along the Donetska railroad northeast of and in northern Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk), as well as southeast of Nelipivka (northwest of Toretsk).[59]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Oleksandro-Shultyne; northwest of Toretsk near Rusyn Yar, Poltavka, Katerynivka, and Oleksandro-Kalynove and toward Berestok, Pleshchiivka, and Stepanivka; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on August 26 and 27.[60] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 27 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bila Hora (north of Toretsk), Shcherbynivka, and Katerynivka.[61]

A milblogger claimed on August 27 that Russian forces are attacking Pleshchiivka in order to cut off Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) between the settlement and Kleban Byk (southwest of Pleshchiivka).[62]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Oleksandro-Shultyne and Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk).[63] Elements of the 20th Guards and 150th motorized rifle divisions (both of the 8th CAA) are reportedly operating near Rusyn Yar and Poltavka.[64]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Hrodivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).[65]

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian MoD claimed on August 27 that Russian forces seized Leontovychi (southwest of Pokrovsk).[66] Russian milbloggers claimed that neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces are able to gain a foothold in Leontovychi, however.[67] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Volodymyrivka (northeast of Pokrovsk) and Myrolyubivka (east of Pokrovsk) and advanced in eastern Zapovidne (northeast of Pokrovsk), northeast of Myrolyubivka, and west of Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[68] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces back to south of Chunyshyne (south of Pokrovsk).[69]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske, Rubizhne, and Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Volodymyrivka, Novoekonomichne, Sukhetske, Krasnyi Lyman, and Zapovidne; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka, Myrnohrad, and Promin and toward Balahan; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and toward Novopavlivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Troyanda, Leontovychi, Udachne, and Kotlyne and toward Molodetske on August 26 and 27.[70] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Leontovychi.[71]

A spokesperson of a Ukrainian corps operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups were operating in Pokrovsk and in Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) in the first half of August, but there are no Russian personnel within the towns currently.[72] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are again trying to attack the Pokrovsk agglomeration in small infantry groups consisting of one to two personnel and that Russia has accumulated about 100,000 servicemen in the Pokrovsk direction. The spokesperson noted that Russian forces were unable to reinforce the recent penetration near Dobropillya (northwest of Pokrovsk) with a larger force grouping. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian assault, sabotage, and reconnaissance groups continue to enter Pokrovsk.[73] Russian milbloggers characterized Udachne as a contested “gray zone,” with Russian forces in Udachne’s south, and Ukrainian forces in Udachne’s north.[74]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies, the Atlant Battalion of the 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]), and the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Rodynske.[75] Elements of the 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are reportedly operating near Volodymyrivka, and drone operators of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly operating near Novoekonomichne.[76]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on August 27 but did not advance. 

Russian forces conducted offensive operations toward Novopavlivka itself; south of Novopavlivka near Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Ivanivka and Zelenyi Hai on August 26 and 27.[77] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zelenyi Hai.[78]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported that Russian forces are attacking in small infantry groups but are struggling to establish crossings over the Vovcha River at scale due to Ukrainian drone operations, so Russian forces are instead focusing on offensive operations further south near Maliivka and Komyshuvakha (southwest of Novopavlivka and southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[79]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on August 27 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Andriivka-Klevtsove; east of Velykomykhailivka near Voskresenka, Sichneve, and Oleksandrohrad; and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Vorone, Komyshuvakha, and Novoheorhiivka on August 26 and 27.[80] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vorone.[81]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating in the Dnipropetrovsk (Velykomykhailivka) direction.[82] Drone operators of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near Ternove (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[83] Drone operators of the 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Sosnivka (southeast of Velykomykhailivka), and drone operators of the 30th Spetsnaz Company (reportedly of the 36th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Novoselivka (east of Velykomykhailivka).[84]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City) 

Russian forces recently advanced in the eastern Zaporizhia direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southern Temyrivka (northeast of Hulyaipole).[85]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Zaporizhia Oblast, including northeast of Hulyaipole near Uspenivka, Poltavka, and Olhivske and east of Hulyaipole near Zelenyi Hai.[86]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 27 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka, south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka, and west of Orikhiv near Plavni and Stepnohirsk on August 26 and 27.[87]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near Stepnohirsk and Plavni; drone operators of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division and 4th Military Base (both of the 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Orikhiv; drone operators of the Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Orikhiv direction; and drone operators of the Viking Drone Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Zaporizhia direction.[88]

Russian forces continued limited assaults in the Kherson direction on August 26 and 27, but did not advance.[89]

Geolocated footage published on August 26 indicates that Russian forces struck civilian infrastructure east of the M-14 Kherson City-Mykolaiv City highway in central Kherson City.[90] Former Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Deputy Ihor Lutsenko stated that Ukrainian officials recognized the M-14 highway as impassable because of Russian drone operations and that Russian forces have officially ”semi-encircled“ Kherson City with drones.[91] Russian milbloggers claimed on August 26 and 27 that any object on the M-14 highway and all “critical” infrastructure, including within residential buildings, in Kherson City is a legitimate target for Russian forces.[92] 

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) contingent arrived in Belarus to participate in joint military exercises connected to the Belarusian-Russian Zapad-2025 military exercise. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on August 26 and 27 that Tajik, Kyrgyz, and Kazakh forces arrived in Belarus to participate in the Interaction-2025, Search-2025, and Echelon-2025 military exercises at the Losvido and Lepelskyi training grounds in Vitebsk Oblast (in northern Belarus bordering Lithuania, Latvia, and Russia) from August 31 to September 6.[93]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.